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ABSTRACT 
Since the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, 
thousands of U.S. service members have been lost and millions of man-hours 
spent on patrols, cordon and searches, and killing or capturing high value targets 
(HVTs). Billions of dollars from Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
(CERP) have been spent on humanitarian aid projects. Despite this investment, 
outcomes remain vague.   
 This thesis devises a system for employment by tactical units to develop 
metrics that determine outcomes in nation assistance.  It begins by defining 
terms and models useful for metric development in nation assistance: Rational 
Actor Theory, Dr. McCormick’s Diamond Model, The Logic Model, and 
Correlation versus Causation.  The thesis then uses historical examples of 
metrics from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Next, data analysis of nation 
assistance operations is reviewed.  Difficulties and shortcomings in these 
historical examples and methods are highlighted. Finally, the thesis covers the 
Failed State Index that forms the base of the system that develops metrics that 
determine outcomes.  The Tactical Outcome Assessment, was developed by 
operationalizing the Failed State Index for use by tactical units.  The Tactical 
Outcome Assessment is the system that tactical units can employ to develop 
metrics that determine outcomes in nation assistance. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Knowing what to measure and how to measure it makes a complicated world 
much less so.1 
In 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq, former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld wrote in a memorandum, “Today, we lack metrics to know if we 
are winning or losing the global war on terror.”2 Since the United States’ 
involvement in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, thousands of U.S. service 
members have been lost, millions of man-hours spent on patrols, cordon and 
searches, and killing or capturing high value targets (HVTs). Billions of dollars 
from Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) have been spent on 
humanitarian aid projects.3   Despite this investment, significantly less has been 
done to determine what outcomes these actions achieved.   
It is too common to hear service members return from recent deployments 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and say, “We don’t know what effect we really had.”  One 
service member who returned from Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines in 
2009 told how the number of circumcisions performed during medical civic action 
programs (MEDCAP) was a metric being tracked, as if the number of 
circumcisions correlated to increased stability in the area.4  Currently, tactical 
level measures of effectiveness (MOEs) do not tell us if we are winning or losing 
the situations in which the U.S. military is involved. 
                                            
1 Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the 
Hidden Side of Everything (New York: Harper Collins, 2006, 14). 
2 Donald Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld Memo, October 13, 2003, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm (accessed January 27, 
2011). 
3 In a report from February 2010, the U.S. Congress has appropriated more than $53 billion 
for Iraq’s reconstruction and $51 billion towards Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Arnold Fields, 
"Testimony of Arnold Fields Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Before the 
Commission on Wartime Contacting," SIGAR.mil, February 22, 2010, 
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-10-001T.pdf  (accessed November 01, 2010).  
4 This information came from a peer discussion during a class at Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, March, 2011.  
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A.   SCOPE OF THESIS – A SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPING METRICS 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer two questions:  
• What metrics should tactical level military units employ for 
measuring outcomes in nation assistance (NA) operations?  
• How should units’ measures of effectiveness in their specific 
operating environments connect to metrics of their command and 
ultimately nest with the broader strategy in U.S. NA operations?   
These questions stem from the assumption that the current operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan align more with the definition of NA than of COIN.  To 
answer the aforementioned questions, a system for use by tactical units will be 
developed that, step-by-step, guides them in developing metrics for their 
operating environment (OE) that are (1) accurate, (2) within a unit’s ability to 
collect, (3) informative, and which (4) determine where and how to spend time 
and money.5  First, accurate is used to mean that there is correlation between 
the outcome (dependent variable) and the metric (independent variables).  The 
metric must have relationship to the outcome.  If a unit’s goal is to protect the 
populace,6 the metric used to measure progress towards protecting the populace 
must identify whether or not progress is being made.  We hope but do not expect 
to find actual causation.  We argue that correlation and experience is enough for 
action.  This will be covered in detail in Chapter IID. Second, The metrics need to 
be within the unit’s ability to collect.  The complexity of nation assistance 
operations has had a tendency to spark ambition and create metrics beyond 
what a tactical unit can accurately report.  Chapter III discusses the historical 
problems of over-measuring in nation assistance operations and measuring the 
wrong indicators.  Metrics from Vietnam will be discussed in this chapter, as well 
                                            
5 MAJ Geoffrey Van Epps originated the idea that the goal of a metric is to determine where 
and how to spend time and money during OIF 09-10. 
6 Protecting the populace has been a recommended and stated goal for both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Elliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath and John Nagle, "Principles, Imperatives, 
and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," Military Review, March-April 2006: 52. General Petraeus 
reiterates the goal of protecting the populace while addressing NATO in July 2010 shortly after 
replacing General McChrystal as the new head of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, “You 
must do everything possible to protect the population.” US chief Petraeus vows to protect Afghan 
civilians, July 1, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10472555  (accessed March 11, 2011). 
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as metrics from current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Third, the metric 
must be informative.  The metric must be able to tell the unit whether or not they 
are moving closer or farther from their outcome.  Fourth, the metric must inform 
the unit’s decision-making loop in determining where and how to spend time and 
money.  The metric must be actionable. 
Unfortunately, commonly used metrics in today’s operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan revolve around the kill or capture of HVTs, the number and costs of 
development projects, or the populace’s access to essential services.7  The latter 
are rife with problems as they fail to measure outcomes.8  For instance, if we 
examine the populace’s access to essential services, the problems of this metric 
will be apparent.  First, access to essential services may not relate to the goal of 
protecting the populous.  Having or not having a modern water treatment facility 
may not affect stability in the area; there may be no correlation of a modern water 
treatment facility to stability, let alone causation.  Second, a tactical unit does not 
have the capability to accurately measure access to essential services.  A tactical 
unit does not have the time, expertise, or resources to conduct a census of the 
population in their OE and then conduct a survey with enough depth to 
accurately measure what percent has access. Third, an accurate measure of the 
populace’s access to a modern water treatment facility does not assist the unit in 
telling whether they are moving farther or closer towards stabilization and 
                                            
7 The kill or capture of HVTs, number and amount of development projects, and access to 
essential services were metrics actively being tracked at Multinational Division Iraq during 2007-
2010.  Another commonly tracked metric was dollars spent.  David Brooks wrote this  in a New 
York Times article: “Many in Congress fixate on “burn rates” — how fast a program can disperse 
money — not effectiveness.”  This effect trickles down to the tactical level where money was used 
more as a metric system than as a weapons system. Smart Power Setback, June 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21brooks.html (accessed July 07, 2011).  
Discussions with peers who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan as staff primaries at the 
JSOTF and BCT level confirm the above were actively tracked on their deployments. 
8 Stephen Downes-Martin discusses the flawed logic and inaccurate use of numbers in 
operation assessments in Afghanistan in his article:  Stephen Downes-Martin, "Operations 
Assessment in Afghanistan is Broken: What is to be Done? [PDF]," Naval War College Review, 
Autumn 2011: 103–125. 
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security objectives.9  Fourth, even if a modern water treatment facility was the 
key to protecting the populace, it would not be actionable.  A tactical unit would 
not be able to build a multi-million-dollar water treatment facility requiring a multi-
year build along with the necessary staff needed for running the facility.  
Therefore, knowing that a functioning water treatment facility is needed for 
stability would not be relevant for a unit in determining where and how to spend 
time and money. 
However, the example of the water treatment facility requires a note.  
Tracking essential service projects does have merit as a metric, but not merit 
directly from the project itself.  Tracking essential service projects and the rate of 
completion of essential service projects executed by the host nation government 
is a valid metric for measuring the functionality of the host nation government.  A 
host nation government must have some form of local authority (with an actual 
budget) in a given area in order to execute an essential service project.  A budget 
is representative of a legitimate revenue based on some level of communication 
between the government and the population.  Essential service projects also 
show that the government must be functioning well enough.  Essential service 
projects started and completed by the host nation government is a valid metric 
that shows government capability. 
 Essential service projects started and completed by the host nation 
government also build legitimacy for the host nation government. In 
counterinsurgency, and nation assistance, the populace and its belief in and 
support of its government is the center of gravity.10  If the populace sees that its 
government is able to provide increasing access to essential services, the host 
nation government will gain legitimacy.  This legitimacy will be undermined if 
external actors (U.S. Forces in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan) are seen as the 
                                            
9 “A conference of experts brought together last year in Wilton Park in Britain concluded that 
there is a ‘surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization 
and security objectives’ in Afghanistan.”  David Brooks, Smart Power Setback, June 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21brooks.html (accessed July 07, 2011). 
10 Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," Military Review, May/June 2005: 9.  
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ones behind the project and not the host nation government.  Unfortunately, in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the projects themselves were the goal and not the 
legitimacy of the host nation government.  This results in combat philanthropy or 
what Bernard Fall referred to when instructing on how Vietnam cannot be won by 
giving out better privies. 
One side says, “land reform,” and the other side says, “better 
culverts.” One side says, “We are going to kill all those nasty village 
chiefs and landlords.” The other side says, “Yes, but look, we want 
to give you prize pigs to improve your strain.”11 
This strategy failed in Vietnam and is failing to produce tangible effects in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.12   
Instead of measuring misadventures in philanthropy or counting the 
number of skins on the wall (kill/capture of HVTs), this thesis seeks to create a 
system that allows tactical units to measure what matters in order to facilitate 
political outcomes in their OE.  The metrics must meet the four previous 
requirements.  The capabilities of the average patrol operating in a conflict 
environment need to be taken into account so the metrics they are being asked 
to report are in line with the unit’s capability to collect.  
B.   METHODOLOGY – THE USE OF A CASE STUDY TO 
OPERATIONALIZE THE FAILED STATE INDEX 
This thesis seeks to answer the questions:  
• What metrics should tactical-level military units employ for 
measuring outcomes in nation assistance (NA) operations?  
                                            
11 Bernard B. Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," The 
Naval War College Review, April 1965: 55.  
12 David Brooks, “Smart Power Setback,” June 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21brooks.html (accessed July 07, 2011). And, 
Edwina Thompson, WINNING ‘HEARTS AND MINDS’ IN AFGHANISTAN: ASSESSING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF DEVELOPMENT AID IN COIN OPERATIONS, April 2010, 
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-report (accessed 
July 23, 2011). 
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• How should a unit’s measures of effectiveness in their specific 
operating environment connect to metrics of their command and 
ultimately nest with the broader strategy in U.S. NA operations?   
The definition of nation assistance from Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign 
Internal Defense is:  
Civil or military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian 
assistance [FHA]) rendered to a nation by US forces within that 
nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, 
based on agreements mutually concluded between the United 
States and that nation.  NA operations support the host nation (HN) 
by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive 
institutions.  The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.  NA 
programs include security assistance (SA), humanitarian and civic 
assistance (HCA), and foreign internal defense (FID).  FID is the 
participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 
any of the action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization, to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to 
their security.13 
Again, the goal of nation assistance is to promote long-term regional 
stability.  In order for the latter two questions to be answered, the metrics for use 
in nation assistance must be capable of measuring progress towards or away 
from long-term regional stability.  This thesis will utilize a case study of a tactical 
unit’s operations inside Sadr City during Operation Iraqi Freedom 08-09.   
Next, this thesis hypothesizes that the twelve indicators of the Failed State 
Index developed by the Fund for Peace,14 operationalized for use by a tactical 
unit, are effective metrics in nation assistance.  First, this case study will show 
that the unit’s actions and individual missions inside Sadr City were nation 
assistance.  Second, the unit’s actions will be shown to have impact on the 
                                            
13 Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense (2010, I-1).  
14 “The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and 
educational organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security.” 
Every year this organization ranks 177 countries across twelve indicators of state effectiveness. 
This becomes the Failed State Index that is published annually by Foreign Policy magazine. 
About the Fund for Peace, 2011, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=aboutus (accessed 
August 21, 2011). 
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indicators from the Failed State Index.  Third, the indicators from the Failed State 
Index, operationalized for use, will be used to evaluate the outcomes produced in 
Sadr City by the tactical unit.  
C.  INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis will be composed of six chapters including the introduction. 
1.  Chapter II – Background for Metrics  
This chapter will review basic models and definitions used in developing 
metrics for nation assistance operations. The rational actor model, used by 
Thomas Schelling,15 will be applied to nation assistance in order to explain the 
motivation of the populace.  This will lead into Dr. McCormick’s Diamond 
Model.16  The Diamond is a useful model in analyzing an area as it contains a 
feedback mechanism that can be used to explain increasing or decreasing 
success as the population support moves from the insurgent to the state or from 
the state to the insurgent.  Next, the logic model will be used to explain the 
differences between inputs, throughputs, outputs, and outcomes.17  These 
definitions are necessary for determining metrics that measure actual results and 
not performance results.  Finally, the chapter will conclude with definitions and 
explanation of correlation and causation.  Chapter V will utilize these models and 
definitions in developing metrics for nation assistance operations. 
2.   Chapter III – When in Doubt of What You Should Measure, 
Measure What You Can 
This chapter begins with historical problems in metrics starting with body 
count in Vietnam.  The chapter will continue to discuss the difficulties in 
developing metrics moving into the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
                                            
15 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 1966, 38–58). 
16 Dr. McCormick’s model of insurgency is best captured in Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic 
Counterinsurgency Modeling," Special Warfare, September 2005: 2–13. 
17 "Logic Model Development Guide” [PDF] (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2004, 1). 
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3.   Chapter IV – Data Analysis:  Numbers Do Not Lie, But They Are 
Open to Interpretation 
This chapter reviews our data analysis as well as our analysis of others’ 
explanations of their data analysis in nation assistance operations.  Prior to 
discussing our data and others’ data, we discuss briefly the difficulty of selecting 
a viable dependent variable.  Levels of violence and number of reported tips, 
commonly used dependent variables in data analysis, may not correlate to long-
term stability.  Long-term stability is a difficult concept and hard to capture as a 
variable. This will lead into the inconclusive results of past attempts at data 
analysis.  Theses containing data analysis by David Beskow, Thomas O’Connell, 
Justin Gorkowski, and Jason Clark and Tracy Onufer will also be discussed. 
4.   Chapter V – Operationalizing the Failed State Index for 
Measuring Outcomes at the Tactical Level 
This chapter will start with an explanation of nation building as this activity 
is directly related to addressing the Failed State Index indicators.  Next, this 
chapter will outline the Failed State Index developed by The Fund for Peace.  
The twelve indicators in the index will be fully explained to show how the 
indicators are measured. Then, the chapter will show how a tactical unit’s 
operations in Sadr City addressed many of the indicators in the Failed State 
Index.  This chapter will conclude with the indicators from the Failed State Index 
being operationalized into the Tactical Outcome Assessment and used in the 
case study of Sadr City to measure the tactical unit’s outcomes. 
 5.   Chapter VI – Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter summarizes the previous chapters.  Models and definitions 
useful for the development of metrics and what are neither effective nor useful in 
determining metrics that measure outcomes in nation assistance will be 
reviewed.   The system this thesis developed for measuring outcomes in nation 
assistance will then be summarized.  The thesis will conclude with 
recommendations on implementation and areas that require further research.  
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II.   BACKGROUND FOR METRICS 
This chapter will review basic models and definitions used in developing 
metrics for nation assistance operations. The rational actor model, used by 
Thomas Schelling,18 will be applied to nation assistance in order to explain the 
motivation of the populace.  This will lead into Dr. McCormick’s Diamond 
Model.19  The Diamond is a useful model in analyzing an area as it contains a 
feedback mechanism that can be used to explain increasing or decreasing 
success as the population support moves from the insurgent to the state or from 
the state to the insurgent.  Next, the logic model will be used to explain the 
differences between inputs, throughputs, outputs, and outcomes.20  These 
definitions are necessary for determining metrics that measure actual results and 
not performance results.  Finally, the chapter will conclude with definitions and 
explanation of correlation and causation.  Chapter V will utilize these models and 
definitions in developing metrics for nation assistance operations. 
A.   THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
Thomas Schelling developed the rational actor model.  The rational actor 
model is based on the cost of punishment associated with noncompliance 
multiplied by the likelihood of the punishment being implemented as the decision 
criteria.21  This is weighted against the benefits of noncompliance.  What this 
means is that a rational actor will evaluate the likelihood that he will be punished 
by an external actor and the capability of that external actor to punish for 
noncompliance against the benefits they will receive for noncompliance.  If the 
likelihood that they will be punished is low or the capability of that actor to punish 
is low, then the external actor will have less influence on the rational actor’s 
                                            
18 Schelling, 1966, 38–58. 
19 Wendt, 2005, 2–13. 
20 "Logic Model Development Guide,”  2004, 1. 
21  Schelling, 1966, 38–58. 
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decision-making process.  If there is more than one external actor, the rational 
actor will make the evaluation of the likelihood and capability to punish for each 
external actor.  The rational actor model is about weighing costs and benefits of 
actions.  This can be further illustrated by a simple equation.   
(Eb*B) – (Ec*C) = Decision 
Eb – expectation for receiving a benefit 
B – the benefit itself 
Ec – expectation of receiving a cost 
C – the cost itself22 
This equation or model will be used in a simple evaluation of a common 
situation faced by villagers in Afghanistan: being confronted by both the Taliban 
and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF).  In this example, both ISAF 
and the Taliban are looking to hold influence over the villagers.  The villagers will 
weigh the benefits they will receive by supporting or not supporting ISAF or the 
Taliban.  The weight of this analysis will be compared against the cost of 
noncompliance with either the Taliban or ISAF based on the Taliban and ISAF’s 
likelihood and capability to punish or inflict costs.  This model is being 
continuously applied to all decisions as the villagers “assess the values of costs 
and benefits every moment of every day.”23  This model is useful in gaining 
insight into the behavior of the villagers.  This model is also useful for U.S. forces 
in explaining why some actions have been ineffective in Afghanistan. 
This model can be used in explaining why there is “surprisingly weak 
evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security 
objectives in Afghanistan.”24  The villagers who are receiving the benefits of the 
aid do not interpret the value to be greater than the costs the Taliban can inflict or 
                                            
22  Edward R. Evans and James R. Spies, INSURGENCY IN THE HOOD: 
UNDERSTANDING INSURGENCIES THROUGH URBAN GANGS, Thesis, Defense Analysis, 
Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006).  
23 Evans and Spies, 2006, 17.   
24 Brooks, 2011.  
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the benefits the Taliban can give.  The villagers are rational actors who are 
making rational decisions.    In order for aid and development to support ISAF in 
Afghanistan, the benefit of the aid must outweigh the cost/benefit of Taliban 
influence or ISAF must be able to nullify the likelihood and capability of the 
Taliban to impart costs and benefits.  If ISAF does not adequately address costs 
and benefits in the decision making process of the villagers, the villagers, as 
rational actors, will make decisions that may not support ISAF. 
B.  DR. GORDON MCCORMICK’S DIAMOND MODEL 
Dr. Gordon McCormick’s model, illustrated below in Figure 1, can be used 
to better understand counterinsurgency.25 
 
Figure 1.   Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model26 
                                            
25 Wendt, 2005. 
26 Wendt, 2005. 
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Looking at the above model, at each point of the diamond there is an actor 
who plays a role in counterinsurgency: the government or state, the people or 
populace, the counter-government or insurgent, and the international actors.  
Five legs construct the relationships among these four actors.  Leg One 
represents a course of action between the government and the people.  Leg Two 
represents a course of action between the insurgency and the people.  Leg 
Three represents a course of action between the government and the insurgent. 
Leg Four represents the relationship between the government and international 
actors.  Leg Five represents a course of action between the insurgents and 
international actors.   
The above diagram does not directly illustrate the feedback and support 
loop from the government and insurgency to the people and international 
actors.27  The government holds a force and power advantage over the 
insurgency.  The insurgency holds an information advantage over the 
government.  So, the government needs the people to provide information and 
the insurgency needs the people to provide the resources (people, guns, and 
money) necessary to increase their power.28  The support sought from 
international actors is the same for both the insurgency and the government; they 
both want logistics and legitimacy.   
Based on this model, the government, operating on Leg One, needs to 
take action to increase its influence over the people to gain information that it can 
use to attack the insurgency (Leg Three), and more importantly the insurgency’s 
relationship to the populace (Leg Two). The insurgency wants to accomplish the 
opposite.  They need to attack the relationship between the government and the 
people (Leg One) by delegitimizing the government and strengthening their 
relationship with the populace through a mixture of coercion and persuasion.  
                                            
27 Mark C. Burke and Eric C. Self, POPULATION ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGY FOR 
UNDERSTANDING POPULATIONS IN COIN ENVIRONMENTS, December 2008, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA494013 
(accessed March 15, 2011). 
28 Burke and Self, 2008. 
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The government wants to fortify ties to the international community (Leg Four) to 
maximize their incoming support and minimize the insurgents’ ties to the 
international community.  Again, the insurgency has similar objectives. 
This is useful in developing metrics because the relationships between all 
actors are identified.  The feedback mechanism is relatively transparent: is the 
government receiving information from the populace and is the insurgency 
receiving resources from the populace? These quantitative questions can be 
used to evaluate effects and outcomes.  Is the populace giving more information 
to the government than they are giving resources to the insurgency?  This 
feedback mechanism sparked initial interest in forming a dependent variable for 
the data analysis.  The original plan was to use incoming tips, representing the 
government’s receiving information, as the dependent variable.  If more tips were 
received, this would correlate to increased stability.  Unfortunately, it was quickly 
found that the data analysis was proving inconclusive.  This will be covered in 
more detail in Chapter IV. 
However, this is not to say the Diamond Model is not valid for determining 
metrics.  The problems with the data analysis stemmed from incomplete 
information in the data.  What were the circumstances under which the data was 
collected?  What was the situation during which the data was collected?  The 
validity of the data was the problem, not the Diamond Model.  The Diamond 
Model can be used by units on the ground to help determine what effects they 
are having.  The unit on the ground will know many of the circumstances around 
the increase or decrease in tips and will be aware of the situation to fully 
understand the context behind an increase or decrease in tips. 
C. THE LOGIC MODEL 
An important tool for developing useful MOEs in COIN is the logic model. 
According to the Kellogg Foundation, “A logic model is a systematic and visual 
way to present and share your understanding of the relationships among the 
resources you have to operate your program, the activities you plan, and the 
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changes or results you hope to achieve.”29  The logic model is composed of four 
elements: inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes. 
Inputs are defined as the resources available to “utilize towards doing the 
work.”30  Resources can be human, such as the number of troops available, the 
amount of money available, or equipment.  Activities are what the organization 
does with the resources.  “Activities are the processes, tools, events, technology, 
and actions…”31 Outputs, by contrast, are the direct products of the activities.  
Outputs could be the number of high value targets (HVTs) killed or captured, the 
number of schools built, or the number of patrols conducted.  Outcomes are the 
specific changes in the target’s “behavior, knowledge, skills, status, and level of 
functioning.”32 
Below, in Figure 2, is an illustrative example of a logic model applied to 
common missions from Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
Inputs Activities Outputs Outcomes 
30 soldiers 
30 M4 Rifles 
4 MRAPs 
Cordon and 
Search of M145 
1 – HVT Captured 
Cache discovered 
Populace in M145 
more supportive of 
GoI and USF  
1 Civil Affairs 
Team 
1 MRAP 
$500,000 in CERP 
Contract a school 
to be built in M342 




supportive of GoI 
and USF 
 
Figure 2.   Example Logic Model 
                                            
29 "Logic Model Development Guide,” 2004, 1. 
30 "Logic Model Development Guide,” 2004, 2.  
31 "Logic Model Development Guide,” 2004, 1. 
32 "Logic Model Development Guide,” 2004, 2. 
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Outcomes are the results of the operation. Per the example above, the 
outcomes are “more supportive to the Government of Iraq.”  A $500,000 school is 
not an outcome.  A $500,000 school adequately staffed and producing educated 
children is not an outcome.  A $500,000 school adequately staffed, producing 
educated children in an area, M145, that is now more supportive to the 
Government of Iraq (GOI) is an outcome.  This represents a change to the 
target’s, M145, behavior.  Within the logic model, building a functioning school is 
an output not an outcome.  A $500,000 school adequately staffed, producing 
educated children in an area that is still placing improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) against U.S. Forces and the Government of Iraq is an outcome; the 
outcome is just negative to the Government of Iraq and U.S. forces. In this 
example and in nation assistance more broadly, measuring outputs is easier than 
measuring outcomes. Nevertheless, it is essential to focus on outcomes, 
because outcomes are results.  Unfortunately, in many situations outputs are 
being measured instead of outcomes.  The below passage by Amitai Etzioni is 
instructive and exemplifies tracking outputs, not outcomes. 
The newest way General Petraeus plans to measure success in the 
war in Afghanistan reminded me of what the government did when 
its campaign to persuade the public to stop smoking did not make 
much headway. It stopped counting how many people had had their 
last cigarette -- and started counting how many anti-smoking 
pamphlets it mailed.33 
D.   PERFECTION IS THE ENEMY OF GOOD ENOUGH: CORRELLATION 
VS. CAUSATION 
1.  Correlation 
Correlation – “…a relationship exists between two factors—let’s call them 
X and Y—but it tells you nothing about the direction of that relationship.  It’s 
possible that X causes Y; it’s also possible that Y causes X; and it may be that X 
                                            
33 Amitai Etzioni, Beware of Generals Carrying Metrics, September 30, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amitai-etzioni/beware-of-generals-
carryi_b_745343.html?ref=email_share (accessed June 13, 2011). 
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and Y are both being caused by some other factor, Z.”34  An easy example of 
correlation is between obesity and diet food.  A trip to the supermarket may 
reveal that many obese people have shopping carts filled with diet food.  
However diet food is not the cause of obesity. Diet food may be correlated with 
obesity, but it is not the cause.35 
2.  Causation 
Causation – A direct relationship exists between the independent variable 
and the dependent variable.  There is a direction in the causal flow, “first x 
happens, and then y results.”36  An example of causation would be to look at the 
situation of the Allgemeine General Hospital in Vienna during the 1840s.  The 
hospital was experiencing nearly a 10% death rate of mothers after delivery of 
their child.  The cause of death was puerperal fever.  Dr. Ignatz Semmelweis, 
through data analysis and one accidental occurrence, was able to trace the 
cause of the fever to the induction of cadaverous particles into the victim’s 
bloodstream.  The cadaverous particles were being carried on the hands of 
doctors who went directly from performing autopsies to delivering babies without 
washing their hands.  The cure was as simple as using a chlorinated wash to 
disinfect the doctors’ hands after performing an autopsy.37 
3.  Experience and Correlation 
Malaria comes from the Italian words “mala aria,” meaning bad air.  The 
name came about as Roman Legions contracted malaria after traveling close to 
swamps.  They believed the bad air coming from the swamps caused malaria.  
                                            
34 Levitt and Dubner, 2006, 10. 
35 The example of diet food and obese people was given in: Zachary Shore, Blunder (New 
York: Bloomsbury USA, 2008) 41. 
36 Shore, 2008, 41.  
37 Steven D. Levitt and Dubner J. Stephen, Super Freakonomics (New York: HarperCollins, 
2009) 133–138. 
 17 
Due to this belief, they began draining the swamps.  The draining of swamps 
resulted in incidents of the disease subsiding.38 
Now it is known that malaria is not spread by bad air but by a parasite 
carried by mosquitoes.  Draining the swamps killed the mosquitoes, which in turn 
prevented the disease from infecting persons.  The outcome of draining swamps 
was fewer cases of malaria.39 
On one hand we can look at the Roman Legions and say they got lucky 
that cases of malaria decreased although they failed to identify the actual cause.  
On the other hand, we need to realize the Roman Legions were aware that areas 
without swamps did not result in cases of malaria.  They saw correlation and 
acted on experience.  The result of their actions was a success, fewer cases of 
malaria.  In today’s modern world, there are also fields where establishing 
causation is problematic, leaving action alone to correlation and experience.  
4.  Correlation Versus Causation in the Fields of Health and 
Medicine 
T. Colin Campbell, PhD and Thomas M. Campbell II, MD further the 
discussion of correlation and causation in The China Study.40  Campbell and 
Campbell’s discussion of correlation versus causation is noteworthy, as 
causation in the medical and health field is nearly impossible to establish with 
absolute certainty.41    
The primary objective of research investigation (in health and 
medicine) is to determine only what is likely to be true.  This is 
because research into health is inherently statistical.  When you 
throw a ball in the air, will it come down?  Yes, every time.  That’s 
physics.  If you smoke four packs a day, will you get lung cancer?  
The answer is maybe.  We know that your odds of getting lung 
                                            
38 The example of the Roman Legions’ response to malaria was in: Shore, 2008, 32. 
39 Shore, 2008, 32. 
40 T. Colin Campbell and Thomas M. Campbell II, The China Study (Dallas: BenBella Books, 
Inc, 2006, 38–40). 
 41 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 38.  
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cancer are much higher than if you didn’t smoke, and we can tell 
you what those odds (statistics) are, but we can’t know with 
certainty whether you as an individual will get lung cancer.42 
Instead of absolute proof, researchers rely on probability, or statistical 
significance.43  Statistical significance is used in analysis to determine if the 
observed effect is replicable under the same conditions or if the observed effect 
happened merely by chance.44  Five percent or less probability is required for 
there to be statistical significance.  This means that if the same conditions are 
present, the observed effect needs to be consistent ninety-five times out of one 
hundred for there to be statistical significance.  100 mice are injected with toxic 
X.  Ninety-five of those mice develop liver cancer.  The data from this experiment 
has statistical significance. 
What needs to be stated is the ninety-five percent is an arbitrary, although 
widely accepted, number.45  What also needs to be stated is the complexity of 
the conditions in which the effects are being observed.  Campbell and Campbell 
were conducting a study on how diet relates to health.  They list several 
problems in their study.   
Experimental limitations such as cost restraints, time constraints and 
measurement error are significant obstacles.  Perhaps most importantly, 
food, lifestyle and health interact through such complex, multifaceted 
systems that establishing proof for any one factor and any one disease is 
nearly impossible, even if you had the perfect set of subjects, unlimited 
time, and unlimited financial resources.46 
These problems bring perspective to trying to analyze relationships in 
nation assistance operations.   
                                            
42 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 38. 
43 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 40. 
44 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 40.  
45 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 40. 
46 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 38.  
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5.  Correlation Versus Causation and the Relationship of 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, in their book Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Social Sciences, write “Highly general and abstract 
theories … which set aside intervening processes and focus on correlations 
between the ‘start’ and ‘finish’ of a phenomenon, are too general to make sharp 
theoretical predictions or to guide policy.”47 However, nation assistance missions 
have even more complexity, uncertainty, and much less control than studies from 
the field of health and medicine.  Highly general and abstract theories may be the 
only theories, especially in nascent phases, to build on when trying to assess the 
relationship of the dependent variable to the independent variables.   
The complexity of many situations in nation assistance, coupled with 
resource constraints, may preclude finding actual causation between dependent 
and independent variables.  Process tracing to identify all the links in the causal 
chain may not be feasible or even necessary.  Looking at an example from the 
health and medical field: despite years of study and millions of dollars, “Smoking 
has never been ‘100%’ proven to cause lung cancer…”48  It is unlikely that any 
one metric will ever be 100% proven to cause a specific outcome.   
Members of the military are continuously reminded they need to be able to 
function under uncertainty.  Finding causation between an independent variable 
and a dependent variable is unlikely.  Finding correlation between an 
independent variable and a dependent variable is more probable.  Pairing 
correlation to experience or research that shows the correlation to be a plausible 
relationship may be sufficient proof for action or decision.  
                                            
47 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) 75. 
48 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 41. 
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III.  WHEN IN DOUBT OF WHAT YOU SHOULD MEASURE, 
MEASURE WHAT YOU CAN 
The process, if not the very idea, of measuring progress against an 
unconventional enemy is exceedingly complicated and is often fraught with 
potential pitfalls.49 
In the process of data collection, the data had become an end unto itself.50 
This chapter begins with historical problems in metrics, starting with body 
count in Vietnam.  The chapter will continue to discuss the difficulties in 
developing metrics moving into the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Colonel Gregory Daddis, from the history department at West Point, was 
tasked by Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) in 2005 “to compose vignettes on 
past counterinsurgencies that might inform current U.S. military operations in 
Iraq.”51  Daddis and a colleague wrote two short essays.  One was on the 
French-Indochina War and the other was on the Vietnam War.  The papers were 
sent to Baghdad.  After a few weeks, a Special Forces group commander, 
“responded to our (Daddis and his colleague) work by asking for any useful 
information on measuring progress in a counterinsurgency environment.”52  This 
group commander was in Iraq on his second tour.  Daddis was surprised that this 
group commander who had just returned for another tour in Iraq “was struggling 
to delineate metrics…”53 
Daddis’ work on metrics and the Special Forces group commander’s 
struggle with metrics came two years after former Secretary of Defense Donald 
                                            
49 Gregoray A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in 
the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, x).  
50 Daddis, 2011, 10. 
51 Daddis, 2011, ix.  
52 Daddis, 2011, ix.  
53 Daddis, 2011, ix.  
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Rumsfeld wrote the following: “Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning 
or losing the global war on terror.”54  What has made metrics so difficult to 
determine?  Looking back to World War II, it is hard to imagine Secretary of War, 
Henry Stimson, lamenting on the lack of metrics to determine whether or not the 
United States was winning or losing.  Outcomes of operations in World War II 
could be seen on a map or judged from numbers on paper.  In the sort of 
conventional fight of World War II, measuring progress was less ambiguous as 
capturing territory and killing the enemy both led to ultimate victory.55   
Terrain arguably served as the most visible scorecard.  In fact, 
during the Normandy campaign, unit effectiveness and forward 
progress could be determined using a number of quantitative 
indicators – the number of troops or units ashore in France, the 
amount of territory under Allied control, the number of phase lines 
passed, or the number of Germans killed, wounded, or captured.56 
Outside of conventional fights, such as the Vietnam War or our current 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, metrics are not as clear.  Capturing territory 
and killing the enemy may not lead to ultimate victory.57  In 1965, as the war 
effort in Vietnam ramped up, the U.S. military began finding that “useful metrics 
for success or failure were not readily identifiable.”58 
With a ubiquitous enemy and no clearly defined front lines, U.S. 
soldiers and commanders struggled to devise substitutes for 
gauging progress and effectiveness. Their (U.S. military) 
conventional experiences offered few useful perspectives.  
Occupying terrain no longer indicated military success.  The 
political context of fighting an insurgency complicated the process 
of counting destroyed enemy units or determining if hamlets and 
villages were secured or pacified.  In short, the metrics for 
                                            
54 Rumsfeld, 2003. 
55 Daddis, 2011, 5. 
56 Daddis, 2011, 5.  
57 “In the end an insurgency is only defeated by good government which attracts voluntary 
popular support.” Robert Thompson, as cited in Daddis, 2011,12; In a counterinsurgency, the 
populace and the populace’s belief in and support of their government is the center of gravity, 
Sepp, 2005, 9. 
58 Daddis, 2011, 5.  
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assessing progress and effectiveness in World War II no longer 
sufficed for counterinsurgency operations.59 
B. METRICS IN VIETNAM 
1.  Hearts and Minds and Body Count 
When one thinks of Vietnam, the two common phrases that come to mind 
are “hearts and minds” and “body count.” Hearts and minds came from General 
Sir Gerald Templer, Director of Operations and High Commissioner of Malaya, 
during the Malaya Emergency.60   The term was spoken in the context “that 
success in COIN rests on the popular perception and this perception has an 
emotive (“hearts”) component and a cognitive (“minds”) component.”61   In 2006, 
the army released their counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24.  FM 3-24 goes 
farther with the definition developed by Templer. 
Once the unit settles into the AO, its next task is to build trusted 
networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and 
minds,” which comprises two separate components. “Hearts” 
means persuading people that their best interests are served by 
COIN success. “Minds” means convincing them that the force can 
protect them and that resisting it is pointless. Note that neither 
concerns whether people like Soldiers and Marines. Calculated 
self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful 
trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace 
enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting 
military forces seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents.62 
“Hearts and minds” has some similarity of concept with another common 
phrase heard in counterinsurgency, “carrots and sticks.”  However, the phrase 
“hearts and minds” became more of a platitude that doling charity or being “nice” 
to the populace will somehow win their hearts and minds.   In Vietnam, hearts 
                                            
59 Daddis, 2011, 5.  
60 Dave Dilegge, Hearts and Minds, October 21, 2007, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/hearts-and-minds/ (accessed March 11, 2011).  
61 Dilegge, 2007.  
62 Field Manual No. 3-24 COUNTERINSURGENCY (Washington, DC: Headquarters 
Department of the Army, 2006). 
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and minds became the image of the “other war” – nation assistance operations.63  
Karen Guttierie further describes the other war as stability operations requiring a 
“whole community of effort, including coordination with governmental and non-
governmental agencies from the host nation and the international community.  
This type of engagement characterized the economic assistance and other non-
kinetic U.S. efforts in Vietnam…”64 
The “other war” as name implies, always was a secondary effort to 
conventional operations.65  The rejection of hearts and minds and the “other war” 
is seen with many decision makers in Vietnam eschewing programs of stability 
and counterinsurgency – “Grab ‘em by the balls, and their hearts and minds will 
follow.”66 
The United States military put more effort into conventional operations, 
believing that their strength advantage would allow them to kill their way to 
victory.67  It  followed a strategy of attrition instead of looking to secure the 
populace – securing the populace, not killing the enemy, is the essential task in 
counterinsurgency.68  But following the strategy of attrition in Vietnam, “Success 
                                            
63 Andrew F., JR. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (John Hopkins University Press, 
1986). 215–233.  
64 Karen Guttieri, "Metrics in Iraq's Complex Conflict Environment," in The Three Circles of 
War, 137−151 (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2010, pp. 140–141). 
65 Krepinevich, 1986, 166. 
66 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, Second Edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1997) 
450.  
67 Krepinevich, 1986, 166.  
68 Krepinevich, 1986, 164–168; COL(R) Kalev Sepp in an interview with PBS discussed a 
story about GEN Casey during his time as MNF-I Commander. The story is that a couple of 
months into his command he addressed his staff and said, "The number of insurgent deaths I'm 
receiving here is equal to or greater than the number two months ago you told me is the number 
of insurgents." Sepp goes on, “Gen. Casey started to get it right away: that this war was not going 
to be about victory through killing insurgents; that the Vietnam-style body count was not going to 
be the metric by which he could measure success in the country.” Frontline: Interview with Col. 
Kalev Sepp (Ret.), June 19, 2007, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/endgame/interviews/sepp.html (accessed November 03, 
2011). 
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in counterinsurgency was made a function of the rate at which U.S. forces killed 
VC.”69  
Metrics are vital to assessing strategies in war.70  What indicators are 
used will determine how operations proceed.  “In Vietnam, the U.S. Marine Corps 
advocated, futilely, for the inclusion of crop production as a measure of success.  
(This indicator may have driven missions more towards supporting nation 
assistance operations.)  The U.S. military focused on body counts rather than 
crop production, creating incentives to emphasize the kinetic fight rather than the 
‘other war.’”71  Body count became the number one measure of effectiveness.  
Body count became the driving force behind operations.72 
2.  The Problems with Body Count  
Great lengths were taken towards body count as the end goal.  The United 
States’ overwhelming firepower allowed for more tonnage of ordnance to be 
dropped on Vietnam than what was dropped in all of World War II.  “By the time 
the Nixon administration signed a cease-fire agreement in January 1973, the 
United States had dropped on North Vietnam, an area the size of Texas, triple 
the bomb tonnage dropped on Europe, Asia and Africa during World War II.”73  In 
January 1969, during an operation in the Quang Ngai province, over 648,000 
pounds of bombs and 2,000 rounds of artillery were used to kill 47 guerrillas.74  
During a three-month period in 1966, the ammunition expenditure equated to 
1,000 rounds of artillery for one enemy killed.75  Despite the inefficiency in the 
use of ammunition, attrition still prevailed as the way to victory. 
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 “The body count quickly became the criterion for measuring success in 
Vietnam.”76  Securing the populace was thwarted in an effort to put more 
numbers (body count) on the board.  However, body count did not factor in to the 
strategy of North Vietnam.  “As General Giap noted, ‘Every minute, hundreds of 
thousands of people die all over the world.  The life or death of a hundred, a 
thousand, or tens of thousands of human beings, even if they are our own 
compatriots, represents really very little.’”77   
Guttieri writes on measures of effectiveness in counterinsurgency, noting 
that falsely reading the environment is potentially disastrous.78  The United 
States falsely read the environment.  Incorrect reporting on body count furthered 
the false read of the environment. 
The push to win through attrition led into problems with misreporting.   The 
misreporting was both a result of willful misconduct, as in the case of the My Lai 
Massacre,79 and negligence. 
The numbers never were accurate because some officers inflated 
their body counts to advance their careers or they simply guessed 
because guerrilla warfare in the jungles and rice paddies of 
Vietnam made counting bodies difficult. In 1967, members of the 
media began questioning whether numbers the military was 
providing were accurate, because the NVA/VC continually matched 
the U.S. escalation, fielding an army when their casualty numbers 
suggested they'd otherwise be unable to do so.80  
FM 3-24 COUNTERINSURGENCY more plainly gives the reasons of body 
count as an ineffective metric.   
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They (body counts) actually measure very little and may provide 
misleading numbers.  Using body counts to measure effectiveness 
accurately requires answers to the following questions:  
How many insurgents were there at the start? 
How many insurgents have moved into the area? 
How many insurgents have transferred from supporter to 
combatant status? 
How many new fighters has the conflict created? 
Accurate information of this sort is usually not available.81  
3.  Problems with Other Metrics in Vietnam 
Although hearts and minds and body count are the two most commonly 
thought of terms from the Vietnam War, the U.S. military did pursue many other 
types of metrics.  Secretary Defense McNamara’s advice to Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam (MACV) was “everything that was measurable should in fact 
be measured.”82  This resulted in massive amounts of data.  Unfortunately, little 
was done to analyze the data and develop meaningful trends.83  As a result, 
metrics from the ground were not nested with strategic objectives. 
The problem with the developing metrics in Vietnam resulted from two 
main causes.  “First, few officers possessed any real knowledge on how to gauge 
progress in an unconventional environment, particularly within the distinct setting 
of South Vietnam…(Second) They (officers) possessed even less understanding 
of the cultural landscape on which they were fighting.”84 
This resulted in nonsense reporting like in the following two examples. 
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Metrics are subject to distortion in the collection process.  In his 
memoir of his days with a military advisory team in Vietnam, David 
Donovan reflected on the role of data in the Hamlet Evaluation 
System and Territorial Forces Evaluation System.  These programs 
involved standardized lists of questions about troop strength, 
morale, numbers of houses with tin roofs, numbers of televisions, 
and the like.  ‘Meeting the deadline for submission of the report was 
the important thing,’ he recalled, ‘not accuracy.’  The Vietnamese 
authorities and the U.S. district chiefs both understood that an A 
rating in the Hamlet Evaluation System put them in good light.  
Donovan wrote, “If I recall correctly, the month the infamous Tet 
offensive broke out, the country was reported to be over ninety-
percent pacified.’85 
An example that best reflects the ‘progress’ being made involves 
several trips made to South Vietnam by Henry Kissinger, then a 
Harvard academic and adviser to New York governor Nelson 
Rockefeller.  Upon visiting the province of Vinh Long in October 
1965, Kissinger was told that 80 percent of the area had been 
pacified.  When he returned to Vietnam the following July, Kissinger 
went again to Vinh Long and looked up the same official to check 
on how pacification was progressing.  The man told Kissinger 
“enormous progress had been made” since his earlier visit: the 
province was now 70 percent pacified!86 
4.  Conclusion  
Inaccuracy in reporting, measuring the wrong metrics, and lack of effective 
analysis of what was reported all contributed to the ineffectiveness of metrics 
during the Vietnam War.  Since there was a failure of metrics at the ground level, 
the metrics were not able to nest with strategic goals.  The failure in developing 
effective metrics can be summed up in a conversation between COL(R) Harry 
Summers and a North Vietnamese colonel after the United States’ withdrawal, 
“‘You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield.’ To which the Communist 
officer replied, ‘That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.’”87 
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C. METRICS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
ISAF must develop effective assessment architectures...to measure 
the effects of the strategy, assess progress toward key objectives, 
and make necessary adjustments. ISAF must identify and refine 
appropriate indicators to assess progress, clarifying the difference 
between operational measures of effectiveness critical to 
practitioners on the ground and strategic measures more 
appropriate to national capitals.88  
General Stanley McChrystal said the above quote soon after taking 
command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2009.  The war 
in Afghanistan had been going on for eight years before McChrystal took 
command.  His quote means that process for developing metrics and products of 
metrics were not adequate.  Therefore, eight years into the war, progress was 
being poorly assessed.89 
1.  Qualitative and Quantitative Metrics 
Iraq and Afghanistan have created a need for strategists to create 
measures of effectiveness for NA missions.  What has been created has had 
minimal success in determining what outcomes operations are having.90  The 
Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) have been of two types, qualitative and 
quantitative.  Military units have difficulty with the scholarly nature of qualitative 
assessments.91  Quantitative assessments have a tendency to develop more 
indicators than military units can accurately report.  Additionally, quantitative 
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assessments focus more on outputs (performance results) than on outcomes 
(effect results). 
Within MOEs more broadly, there are challenges to using both qualitative 
and quantitative metrics. Some developers of qualitative assessments have 
argued that the intricacy and uniqueness of each environment in 
counterinsurgency, reconstruction, and stability operations do not allow for 
standardizing metrics.  For example, a paper published by the Canadian 
Peacekeeping Press states that such a system “does not allow for the qualitative 
human phenomena upon which the military is coming in close contact…”92 
However, the average service member who interacts with the local populace 
needs a simple, standardized assessment system for efficiency.93   
a.  Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework 
(TCAPF) 
The TCAPF is a qualitative assessment to “identify the causes of 
instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the 
effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability in a tactical-level (brigade, 
battalion, or company) area of operations (AO).”94  The TCAPF is a simple 
product that utilizes a four-step process consisting of collection, analysis, design, 
and evaluation.95  The collection process is a two-part system.  The first step is a 
simple questionnaire that is designed to be used by patrols to swiftly obtain a 
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wide array of meaningful data in four questions.  The four questions were 
selected to provide indicators of relative stability, causes of instability, level of 
support to the host nation government, and what can be done to aleviate causes 
of instability.96  Below, in Figure 3, is an example of a TCAPF used in Iraq. 
 
Figure 3.   Sample TCAPF from Iraq 
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The second part in the collection process is targeted interviews with 
key local stakeholders.97  The second part is to act as a control to the first part of 
the collection process.  Select individuals conduct the targeted interviews.  This 
is in contrast to the first part that was designed for use at the lowest level.  The 
targeted interviews go in to greater depth and “provide more detail on the causes 
of instability while helping determine how best to address those causes and 
measure progress toward that end.”98 
The information from the collection process is then analyzed.  The 
information can be inputted as data into a geospatial software package or 
otherwise mapped to visually and graphically show the causes of instability, the 
sources of resiliency, and nodes for future targeting.99 
Design and evaluation are the final two-steps in the four-step 
process.  Design is the phase where programs are created to achieve effects on 
the identified causes of instability.  Evaluation is the phase that tracks, compares, 
and measures the opinions of the populace.100 The idea behind the TCAPF is 
the following: 
The TCAPF continually asks the people the same basic four 
questions so, over time, the changing opinion of the population can 
be tracked, compared, measured, and displayed. By not being 
subjective, the results of the questioning cannot be altered by those 
who ask questions or analyze results. Thus a longer-term narrative 
of the people is created that should ease situational awareness of 
new troops into theater and provide continuity of analysis and 
action.101 
One of the authors of this paper, while serving as a BCT S9, used 
the TCAPF in Iraq.  The results of the TCAPF varied greatly among the 
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battalions.  The TCAPF is supposed to be a simple process.  However, in many 
cases, the simple form of four basic questions was not filled out completely or 
correctly.  Many forms had missing geographical data, rendering the information 
useless.  The answers to the four questions were too vague to be useful.  Even 
when the completed forms were properly filled out, when aggregated, the data 
was random and inconclusive. 
Wilson and Conway note similar problems in their critique of the 
TCAPF, “the soldiers (using the TCAPF) are not as experienced as social 
scientists when it comes to a commitment to scientific rigor, nor are they 
experienced interviewers with a high level of ability to ask questions consistently 
and probe respondents in order to gain more relevant or more complete answers 
without biasing the data in any way.”102  
Note that the above critique does not go into analyzing the 
effectiveness of the four questions.  The critique above is only on the application 
of the TCAPF in Iraq and Afghanistan.103  This assumes that the four questions 
are capable of measuring outcomes.   
b.  Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) 
Quantitative metrics are also difficult in counterinsurgency 
environments.  Despite refuting the value of quantitative metrics in the Canadian 
Peacekeeping paper, the authors admit that “numbers count to the military.”104   
However, quantitative assessments have their own challenges.  Quantitative 
assessments have developed an intimidating number of indicators in efforts to 
measure all the intricacies in a counterinsurgency environment.  For example, 
the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) is a framework that 
contains over 800 individual metrics layered under multiple categories and 
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subcategories.105  The unit has responsibility to choose which of these 800 
metrics are relevant to their situation.  Often, several hundred metrics are 
chosen.  The results of trying to gather information on this many metrics can 
overwhelm soldiers on deployment, who have many other duties, and can result 
in misreporting, due to time constraints or lack of understanding of the metrics.  
This can lead to what Daddis cites in his book on metrics in Vietnam, “MACV – 
and much of DoD – went about measuring everything and, in a real sense, 
measured nothing.”106   
c.  United States Agency for International Development’s 
“F” Framework 
Similarly, USAID’s “F” Framework identifies almost 190 indicators 
for their strategic goal of promoting economic growth and prosperity.107 In a 
report published by USAID, the author states, “existing systems are not providing 
adequate information to determine which programs have worked or how well they 
have worked in helping partner countries reach a sustainable path to rapid and 
broad-based growth.”108 The criticism of the “F” framework is that indicators 
measuring outcomes are supposed to serve as “bench marks of progress 
towards achieving higher-level outcomes.”109 This goal is not being achieved 
because the metrics are too many and too complicated. 
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d.  RAND and Brookings Institute MOEs for 
Counterinsurgency 
RAND and the Brookings Institute have also developed MOEs for 
counterinsurgency operations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The RAND 
report, Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Army, has been 
criticized for being overly technical, utilizing calculus and math equations to 
measure data.110  The Brookings Institute’s Afghanistan Index earned the same 
critique, “far too comprehensive for field operators faced with spur of the moment 
decisions.”111   
e.  Polling Data 
Polling of local civilians has also become more widespread as field 
operators attempt to determine outcomes.  However, polling data comes with its 
own set of problems. How people say they behave is known as declared 
preference, while how they actually behave is known as revealed preference.112 
Not surprisingly, the two preferences frequently differ. “There is often a vast gulf 
between how people say they behave and how they actually behave.”113  
Because of this intrinsic shortcoming of human nature, polling data may not be 
so accurate. 
f.  David Kilcullen’s MOEs from Counterinsurgency 
Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen devoted a chapter in his 
latest book, Counterinsurgency, to a list of metrics useable by tactical-level units 
in Afghanistan.   The metrics focus on outputs or, in Kilcullen’s words, “detectable 
events in the environment that indicate progress toward, or away from, identified 
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goals.”114 Examples of what he terms “more useful metrics” are: voluntary 
reporting, transportation prices, and progress of NGO constructions projects.  
Kilcullen individually explains each one of the metrics and how it is an indicator of 
identified goals or outcomes.  However, in the chapter’s concluding paragraphs 
he states that the metrics explained in the previous pages “were also out of date 
the moment they were written down.”115  This last line points to the need for a 
system for developing metrics and not a prescriptive list. 
2.  Conclusion 
The overarching problem with MOEs developed for Iraq and Afghanistan 
is that there is no system for developing metrics.  Qualitative methods have 
created metrics too difficult for military units to operationalize.  Quantitative 
methods require too many indicators for reporting and focus more on measuring 
outputs than outcomes.  There is no system that allows units on the ground to 
develop their own specific metrics within a larger system that explains what 
needs to be measured and how to measure it.  
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IV.   DATA ANALYSIS – NUMBERS DO NOT LIE BUT THEY ARE 
OPEN TO INTERPRETATION 
This chapter reviews our data analysis as well as our analysis of others’ 
explanations of their data analysis in nation assistance operations.  Prior to 
discussing our data and others’ data, we discuss briefly the difficulty of selecting 
a viable dependent variable.  Levels of violence and number of reported tips, 
commonly used dependent variables in data analysis, may not correlate to long-
term stability.  Long-term stability is a difficult concept and hard to capture as a 
variable. This will lead into the inconclusive results of past attempts at data 
analysis.  Theses containing data analysis by David Beskow, Thomas O’Connell, 
Justin Gorkowski, and Jason Clark and Tracy Onufer will also be discussed. 
A. COMMONLY USED DATA REPOSITORIES  
1. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) – Unclassified database.  
Compiles comprehensive data on “incidents in which subnational or clandestine 
groups or individuals deliberately or recklessly attacked civilians or 
noncombatants (including military personnel and assets outside war zones and 
war-like settings).”116 
2. Tactical Integrated Ground Reporting (TIGR) – Classified database.  
Web-based geographic information sharing and reporting system, currently used 
by tactical-level units in Iraq and Afghanistan.  TIGR receives and displays 
spatial combat reports entered directly by units.  TIGR “merges data from 
established databases, notably Combined Information Data Network Exchange 
(CIDNE).”117 
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3. Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) – Classified 
database. “CIDNE was created to collect and analyze critical battlefield data to 
provide daily operational and intelligence community reporting relevant to a 
commander's daily decision-making processes.”118  CIDNE “has become the 
recognized source for analyzing enemy action, and is reliable for type, location, 
and frequency of significant enemy events.”119 
B. DIFFICULTY IN SELECTING A DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN NATION 
ASSISTANCE 
1. Selection of the Dependent Variable 
The first difficulty encountered in attempting data analysis for nation 
assistance missions is the selection of a viable dependent variable.  In nation 
assistance missions, the goal of the operations is to promote long-term regional 
stability.  Below is the definition of nation assistance from Joint Publication 3-22, 
Foreign Internal Defense:  
Civil or military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian 
assistance [FHA]) rendered to a nation by US forces within that 
nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, 
based on agreements mutually concluded between the United 
States and that nation.  NA operations support the host nation (HN) 
by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive 
institutions.  The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.  NA 
programs include security assistance (SA), humanitarian and civic 
assistance (HCA), and foreign internal defense (FID).  FID is the 
participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 
any of the action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization, to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to 
their security.120 
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2. What is Representative of the Dependent Variable? 
The dependent variable needs to represent the goal of promoting long-
term regional stability.  Herein lies the difficulty: what represents long-term 
regional stability?  Some who have conducted data analysis for the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have used violence against coalition forces, violence 
against civilians, or number of tips reported as the dependent variable.121  
Examples of the independent variables were the number of patrols, amount (both 
monetary and quantity) of aid or development projects, number of caches found 
or some sort of aggregated data sets like “friendly activity,” “enemy activity,” or 
“popular support.”  Unfortunately, due to the complexity of nation assistance and 
the complexity of the goal of nation assistance, choosing any of the 
aforementioned examples as a dependent variable may be lacking.   
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3. Historic Problems Representing the Dependent Variable in 
Data Analysis 
The most commonly seen dependent variable has been represented by 
violence, either against coalition forces (SIGACTs pulled from CIDNE), the 
populace (pulled from WITS) or both.  However, a decrease in violence may not 
mean progress towards long-term stability.  “A decrease in enemy incidents 
might mean the government was in control but might also mean the insurgents 
were so established politically they no longer needed to fight.”122  David Kilcullen 
supports this idea.  “Violence tends to be high in contested areas and low in 
government-controlled areas.  But it is also low in enemy-controlled areas, so 
that a low level of violence indicates that someone is fully in control of a district 
but does not tell us who.”123   
Levels of violence also have potential to increase as coalition presence 
becomes greater.  An increase of either troops in a given area, or the number of 
areas in which troops are operating, has potential to raise violence levels as 
there is a higher probability of enemy contact.124  Kilcullen also notes the 
“observer effect” from increased troop presence.  The observer effect results in 
an increase in reported violence as the increased troop presence also brings an 
increase in “eyes out on the ground observing and reporting violence.”125  An 
additional effect, Kilcullen notes in the Accidental Guerrilla, is that they fight us 
because we are there.126  Kilcullen theorizes: 
Most of the adversaries Western powers have been fighting since 
9/11 are in fact accidental guerrillas:  people who fight us not 
because they hate the West and seek our overthrow but because 
we have invaded their space to deal with a small extremist element 
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that has manipulated and exploited local grievances to gain power 
in their societies.  They fight us not because they seek our 
destruction but because they believe we seek theirs…127 
Not only may additional troops increase violence through more probable 
contact with the enemy, the additional troops may increase violence by creating 
more “enemy.”  However, the main point of this section is that violence is not 
representative of long-term stability and therefore is not a good selection as a 
dependent variable. 
5. A Viable Dependent Variable 
A viable dependent variable for nation assistance will be one that 
represents long-term stability.  Unfortunately, the complexity of long-term stability 
may preclude any one specific variable such as level of violence from being 
used.  Long-term stability is composed of many factors and many factors are 
specific to individuals in the populace. “Political will, loyalty of the population, and 
an individual’s sense of security cannot be accurately measured.”128  The coming 
chapters of this thesis will argue that ranking in the Failed State Index by the 
United States Institute of Peace may serve as the most viable dependent 
variable.  In the coming paragraphs, we will continue to show the problems of 
data analysis. 
C. DIFFICULTIES IN DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Problems with Accuracy of Data Sets 
For the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, volumes of data have been 
collected.  “Every day over 100,000 records of combat information are entered 
into various data bases in Afghanistan.”129  However, like all data, data from Iraq 
and Afghanistan “is only as accurate as the discipline, reporting standards, and 
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priorities of those units reporting.”130  WITS has a disclaimer that states “The 
Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) data is provided for statistical 
purposes only.  The statistical information contained in WITS is based on factual 
reports from a variety of open sources that may be of varying credibility.”131  
More importantly, WITS data is limited only to what the U.S. Government 
considers terrorist violence.  Crime and other types of violence are not reported 
in WITS.  Even if none of these problems existed, there are still problems. 
When analyzing data, it is almost impossible to know the circumstances in 
which the data was collected.  The data set may tell you exactly where, when, 
and how many improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were found, enemy direct 
attacks occurred, or tips called-in.  However, the data does not tell you if more 
friendly or enemy troops moved into the area, if friendly or enemy troops 
changed their TTPs, or if there was a change in the civilian population.  As a 
result, findings from the data can be scrutinized with questions that cannot be 
answered.  
O’Connell found in his data analysis that there was an inverse relationship 
between local, small-scale security projects and Taliban attacks. “Local, small-
scale security projects, rather than decreasing attacks, actually increased Taliban 
attacks, in some cases accounting for an amazing 76 percent of the increase.”132  
What the increase does not show is why, or the other circumstances that may be 
responsible for the increase.  Did the local, small-scale security projects result in 
the security forces patrolling in new areas or patrolling more aggressively?  Did  
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resulted in a Multiple R value of .765.  Data analysis more commonly uses R squared values, 
which are lower. Statistical significance is widely accepted at 95 percent.  The Multiple R value of 
.765 really is not that high of a percent.  Also, the Multiple R value is only explaining 76.5 percent 
of the variability in increased violence.  This does not mean that security projects are increasing 
violence by 76 percent. O’Connell, 2008. 
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the security projects result in additional troops?  Did more enemy move into the 
area during the time of the increase?  Many antecedent conditions cannot be 
discerned in data analysis. 
2. No Smoking Gun – The Results of Data Analysis 
In this research, we will use the causes of instability (including, but not 
limited to, violence against civilians and direct and indirect attacks against 
coalition forces) as our dependent variable. Our goal is to find the variables that 
allow for either a decrease in this value or a leveling off of this variable at a stable 
value. 
The analysis was focused on three areas/provinces in Afghanistan: Kunar 
and Kabul area, Kandahar province, and Helmand province.  The data was 
obtained from WITS and declassified CIDNE data.  The data was then 
normalized and aggregated into three categories, “Friendly Actions,” “Causes of 
Instability,” and “Indicators of Popular Support.”  Friendly actions were all 
activities conducted by U.S. troops outside of a base.  Causes of instability 
included but were not limited to violence against civilians and direct and indirect 
attacks against coalition forces.  Indicators of popular support included but were 
not limited to called-in tips and caches found.  The monetary value of 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects were also 
included in the data analysis.  Below, in Figures 4, 5, and 6, are the resulting 




Figure 4.   Kunar & Kabul Area Indicators of Popular Support, Causes of  
Instability, Friendly Actions and CERP Expenditure 
 
Figure 5.   Kandahar Indicators of Popular Support, Causes of Instability,  
Friendly Actions and CERP Expenditure 
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Figure 6.   Helmand Indicators of Popular Support, Causes of  
Instability, Friendly Actions and CERP Expenditure 
In the limited sampling above, CERP expenditure does not appear to have 
correlation to indicators of popular support.  CERP expenditure does appear to 
have slight correlation to causes of instability, offset with a couple months’ lag.  
From the data sets, an increase in CERP expenditure creates an increase in 
causes of instability a few months later.  This seems counterintuitive.  CERP 
should have been seen to increase indicators of popular support.  Instead, the 
above graphs show the opposite may have occurred.  Increased CERP spending 
may have no effect or negative impact on violence and causes of instability.  
Although counterintuitive, findings that show inverse relationships to CERP 
expenditure and stability are prevalent.133 
                                            
133 O’Connell (2008) found that expenditure on certain types of projects (education, medical 
care, and security) either had no effect on levels of violence or increased levels of violence.  
Gorkowski (2009) found that CERP expenditure in more “needing” but less “deserving” areas had 
weak correlation to increases in violence.  Brooks (2011) reported on a conference of experts in 
Wilton Park in Britain who concluded that there is a ‘surprisingly weak evidence base for the 
effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives’ in Afghanistan.” 
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Friendly actions appear to have a high degree of correlation to indicators 
of popular support in the Kandahar and Helmand data set above, with friendly 
actions closely mirroring indicators of popular support.  This seems to suggest 
that just getting out and having presence amongst the populace creates popular 
support.  However, this is a small sampling and the data set from the Kunar and 
Kabul areas appears significantly more random and less correlated between 
friendly actions and indicators of popular support. 
Friendly actions and causes of instability appear to have a degree of 
correlation in the above three data sets.  Friendly actions appear to lag behind 
causes of instability.  This is somewhat intuitive; as instability increases, friendly 
actions will increase in an attempt to bring down the level of instability.  Overall 
from this simple, basic data analysis, there appears to be nothing absolutely 
telling.  The same is true in other’s work with data analysis. 
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3. In a One-Chance, Zero Sum Game Where Every Option Has a 
Cost, What Probability Do You Need for Action? 
Jason Clarke and Tracy Onufer, in their thesis, Understanding 
Environmental Factors that Affect Violence in Salinas, California, found that there 
is a 67 percent correlation between the unemployment rate and violence in 
Salinas.134  “This means 67 percent of the time, if the unemployment rate 
increased or decreased, violence respectively increased or decreased.”135  
Below, Figure 7, is the respective plot comparing 17 years of unemployment 
rates to rates of violence. 
 
Figure 7.   Unemployment Rate vs. Violence Rate in Salinas, CA136 
First, Clarke and Onufer used the rate of violence as their dependent 
variable.  Decreasing the rate of violence was their goal.  Using rate of violence 
as a dependent variable works for this situation as the dependent variable 
                                            
134 Clarke & Onufer, 2009. 
135 Clarke & Onufer, 2009. 
136 Clarke & Onufer, 2009. 
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reflects the goal.  To note from previous paragraphs, the exportability of the rate 
of violence as a dependent variable in nation assistance has difficulties.   
Clarke and Onufer continue in their analysis and recommend that Salinas 
should develop a contingency plan for spikes in the unemployment rate.137  The 
contingency plan “could include more police patrols as a proactive measure 
against violence, emergency funds to help the local citizens, food banks, and 
shelters, or job placement assistance to help laid-off workers.”138  However, 
every option has a cost and the city has a limited budget and limited number of 
personnel.  Diverting money and personnel to one of Clarke and Onufer’s 
recommended options takes money and personnel away from another program.  
This is a zero sum game.  Is a 67 percent chance that violence will increase 
worth the cost of diverting resources?  This situation becomes even more 
complex in nation assistance. 
Justin Gorkowski in his thesis, A Penny for Your Thoughts, A Nickel for 
Your Heart:  The Influence of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
on Insurgency, analyzed CERP expenditure to violent acts in At Tameem, Iraq.  
In the analysis, Gorkowski found: 
Correlative analysis for violent acts and CERP money spent by 
village for all At Tameem villages reveals a value of (+) 0.302. This 
weak positive relationship shows that at the village level of analysis, 
the more CERP money that is spent, the more violent acts 
occur.139 
                                            
137 Clarke & Onufer, 2009. 
138 Clarke & Onufer, 2009. 
139 Justin B. Gorkowski, A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS, A NICKEL FOR YOUR 
HEART: THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM 
ON INSURGENCY, December 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a514272.pdf (accessed 
October 10, 2011). 
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The below scatter-plot, Figure 8, shows the aforementioned relationship. 
 
Figure 8.   Scatter-plot of Violent Acts per CERP $ Spent in At Tameem 
Gorkowski suggests that CERP expenditure is actually increasing 
violence.  However, the correlation between CERP expenditure and increasing 
violence is only 30.2 percent.  This means that only 30.2 percent of the variability 
in increasing violence is explained by CERP expenditure.  Remembering that the 
widely accepted percent for statistical significance is 95 percent, this is weak 
correlation and correlation does not mean causation.   
Does CERP money still get spent in hostile areas?  These are tough 
questions and black-and-white answers are hard to find.  What makes matters 
even more difficult is that the goal of long-term stability is not immediate.  “The 
peace and security timetable is measured in years or decades. Development 
progress, if it comes at all, is measured in generations.”140  It is tough to find 
answers in data analysis.  
  
                                            
140 Brooks, 2011. 
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V.  OPERATIONALIZING THE FAILED STATE INDEX FOR 
MEASURING OUTCOMES AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the goals of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan is to protect 
the populace.  In any counterinsurgency, a subset of nation assistance, the 
populace’s support for their government is the center of gravity of the overall 
conflict.141  Ultimate success is achieved by protecting the populace.142   
The method being used towards this goal resembles nation building.  
Utilizing this assumption, we can then look to metrics used to measure outcomes 
in nation building.  The Failed State Index developed by the Fund for Peace has 
developed metrics for this purpose.  However, the metrics they are using are for 
measuring outcomes at the strategic level.  This chapter will operationalize the 
Failed State Index for use by a tactical unit. 
First, this chapter will start with an explanation of nation building as this 
activity is directly related to addressing the Failed State Index indicators.  
Second, this chapter will outline the Failed State Index developed by The Fund 
for Peace.  The twelve indicators in the index will be fully explained to show how 
the indicators are measured. Third, the chapter will show how a tactical unit’s 
operations in Sadr City addressed many of the indicators in the Failed State 
Index.  Fourth, the indicators from the Failed State Index will then be 
operationalized into the Tactical Outcome Assessment and used in the case 
study of Sadr City to measure the tactical unit’s outcomes. 
                                            
141 Sepp, 2005, 9.  
142 General Petraeus reiterated this while addressing NATO in July 2010 shortly after 
replacing General McChrystal as the new head of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, “You 
must do everything possible to protect the population.” US chief Petraeus vows to protect Afghan 
civilians, July 1, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10472555 (accessed March 11, 2011).  This 
idea is also stated in: Elliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath and John Nagle, "Principles, 
Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," Military Review, March-April 2006: 52.  
 52 
B.   NATION BUILDING 
The RAND Corporation, in a report titled The Beginner’s Guide to Nation 
Building published in 2007, defines nation building as an operation that “involves 
the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and 
economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from 
conflict into one at peace with itself and neighbors.”143  The most successful 
examples of nation building are Germany and Japan following World War II. The 
nation building efforts in Japan and Germany were “aimed to engineer major 
social, political, and economic reconstruction.”144  These efforts set a standard of 
success that has not been replicated.145   
From the above paragraph, we can see that nation building is more than 
providing stability.  Nation building is engineering major social, political, and 
economic reconstruction of a state.  As a result, the essential elements of a 
nation building mission are composed of establishing and increasing the capacity 
of the targeted nation’s military, police, rule of law, and governance, and 
improving and affecting humanitarian relief, economic stabilization, 
democratization and development.146  These essential elements are also what 
the Failed State Index’s twelve indicators are measuring.   
C.   THE FAILED STATE INDEX 
1.  Introduction to the Failed State Index 
The Failed State Index was developed by The Fund for Peace, “an 
independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational 
                                            
143 James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Crane Keith and Cole Degrasse Beth, The Beginner's 
Guide to Nation Building, 2007, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557.html (accessed 
August 31, 2011).  
144 James Dobbins, et al., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 2003, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753.html (accessed August 31, 2011).  
145 Dobbins, et al., 2003. 
146 Dobbins, et al., 2007. 
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organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable 
security.”147  The Fund addresses policy-level as well as ground-level issues 
emanating from weak and failing states.  They have worked in over fifty countries 
with governments, international organizations, academics, journalists, civil 
society networks, and the private sector.148  Every year, they rank 177 countries 
across twelve indicators.  The Failed State Index is published annually by 
Foreign Policy magazine. 
The Failed State Index only concerns itself with sovereign states 
recognized by membership in the United Nations.  For this reason, Taiwan, the 
occupied territories of Palestine (these territories are included in the assessment 
of Israel), and Kosovo are not included.  There are also additional states that are 
not included due to insufficient data.149 
                                            
147 About the Fund for Peace, 2011, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=aboutus 
(accessed August 21, 2011). 
148 The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
149 The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
 54 
2.  The Twelve Indicators of the Failed State Index 
Figure 9 lists the 12 indicators in the Failed State Index. 
 
Figure 9.   Failed State Indicators150 
These twelve indicators are further broken down, on average, into 
fourteen sub-indicators or measures for each of the twelve indicators.  Mounting 
demographic pressures contain sub-indicators or measures like disease control, 
food supply, population density, and infant mortality.  The sub-indicators can be 
put into one-line questions that can be answered with either quantitative or 
qualitative data.151 
                                            
150 The Fund for Peace, 2011.  
151 The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
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3.  Sources of Data for the Failed State Index 
The data for the Failed State Index comes from news articles, essays, 
magazine articles, speeches, and government and non-government reports.  
Blogs and other forms of social media are not included in the data.  Thousands of 
reports are compiled daily; millions of documents are downloaded annually from 
a search landscape of 115,000 online English language publications.152 
The media is then subjected to a scan using proprietary software.  
Boolean phrases on indicators from the Conflict Assessment System Tool 
(CAST) framework retrieve relevant material while filters built into the software 
eliminate irrelevant and erroneous documents.   Next, quantitative data from the 
United Nations High Commission of Refugees (UNHCR), World Health 
Organization (WHO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
Transparency International, World Factbook, Freedom House, World Bank, and 
other reputable, reliable sources are brought into the Fund’s proprietary software 
package.  Then, a qualitative review of each indicator for each country is 
conducted to compare the results of the media search and quantitative data 
input.  These three sources (media search, quantitative data, and qualitative 
review) are used in the methodology to triangulate the data to produce the final 
scores for the Failed State Index.153 
4.  Scoring the Failed State Index 
The scores for the Failed State Index come from scaling (from 0-10) the 
aggregated, then normalized data for each of the twelve indicators.  An algorithm 
is used for the scoring.  A score of zero is the most stable.  A score of 10 is the 
least stable.  The 177 countries can receive a score anywhere between 0 and 
120, with a score of 120 being the most unstable.    Somalia, Chad, and Sudan 
(the three lowest-ranking states) have scores of 113.4, 110.3, and 108.7, 
                                            
152 The Fund for Peace, 2011.  
153 All information in this paragraph came from: The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
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respectively.  The three highest-ranking states, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, 
have respective scores of 19.7, 20.4, and 22.8.  The Fund for Peace ensures the 
validity of the scores.  “This multi-stage process has several layers of scrutiny to 
ensure the highest standards of methodological rigor, the broadest possible 
information base including both quantitative and qualitative expertise, and the 
greatest accuracy.”154 
5.  Uses for the Failed State Index 
The Failed State Index provides validated information in an easy to access 
format to many different agencies. 
• Government uses - early warning and to design economic 
assistance strategies that can reduce the potential for conflict and 
promote development in fragile states 
• Military uses - strengthen situational awareness, enhance 
readiness, and apply strategic metrics to evaluate success in peace 
and stability operations 
• Private sector uses - calculate political risk for investment 
opportunities 
• Multinational organizations and other entities use - modeling and 
gaming, management of complex organizations, and for conflict-risk 
assessment  
• Educators use - train students in analyzing war and peace issues 
by blending the techniques of information technology with social 
science 
• Rated country uses - self-assessment to gauge their own stability 
and performance on objective criteria155 
Overall, the use of the Failed State Index is to identify and diagnose 
problems.  Identification and diagnosis is the first step in strengthening weak and 
failing states.  This can be used as an early warning by “more reliable 
policymakers”156 to implement assistance strategies that “can act to prevent 
                                            
154 The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
155 The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
156 “The more reliable policymakers” was a term from: The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
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violent breakdowns, protect civilians caught in the crossfire, and promote 
recovery.”157  Policies must focus on the five core institutions: military, police, 
civil service, system of justice, and leadership.  The assessment methodology 
used in the Index should continuously monitor what effects a policy is having.  
Monitoring will allow the policymakers to make informed decisions regarding 
strategic choices for weak or failing states.  The goal is to prevent failed states 
and assist in the recovery of failed states. 
6.   Characteristics of Failed States 
“States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or 
invasion over different time periods.”158 A failed state will have one or more of 
the following characteristics: 
• Loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force  
• Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions 
• Inability to provide reasonable public services 
• Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the 
international community  
Risk Elements from the twelve indicators: 
• Extensive corruption and criminal behavior 
• Inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support 
• Large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population 
• Sharp economic decline 
• Group-based inequality 
• Institutionalized persecution or discrimination 
• Severe demographic pressures 
• Brain drain 
• Environmental decay  
                                            
157 The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
158 The Fund for Peace, 2011. 
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7.   Conclusion 
Operationalizing the Failed State Index is the first step in preventing failed 
states.  The Failed State Index identifies problem states.  Once a state is 
identified as failing, it is then up to the international community to decide whether 
or not their interests in the failing state and the results of the failing state are 
worth the cost of action.   
The action can be nation building and the United States will most likely be 
involved to some extent.  The RAND Corporation states, “Nation-building, it 
appears, is the inescapable responsibility of the world’s only superpower.”159  
Nation building, in many instances, takes place in conflict environments that 
require armed forces.  The Army is the branch of service most directly involved 
with nation building as they deploy units on nation assistance missions.  The 
following case study demonstrates how an Army unit at the tactical level 
conducted nation assistance operations while deployed to OIF 08-09.   
D.   SADR CITY CASE STUDY 
1.  Background and History of Sadr City 
Hassan Shama, Sadr City District Council Chair, once asked, “Do you 
know that in some parts of the city, we have more than 30 family members living 
in an area of 1000 square feet?”160  Sadr City is a slum; a Shi’a slum that 
suffered under a repressive Sunni government and then fought against a Sunni 
insurgency.  
Sadr City is one of the nine katis or districts that make up the Amanat of 
Baghdad.161  Inside the city of Baghdad, Sadr City lies to the northeast, 
approximately 5 miles east of the Tigris River. On a map, it looks roughly like a 
                                            
159 Dobbins, et al, 2007. 
160 Anita McNaught, Winning the Peace in Iraq by Rebuilding Sadr City, June 26, 2008, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,371764,00.html (accessed May 27, 2011). 
161 Amanat refers to the term, “inside the city.” Republic of Iraq District Government Field 
Manual Version 2, PDF (USAID, 2007).   
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baseball diamond with the legs of the square measuring approximately three 
miles.   In these nine square miles, population estimates have placed the number 
of inhabitants anywhere between a low of 2 million and a high of 3.2 million.162  
Baghdad has a population of 5.75 million.163  Using the low population estimate, 
Sadr City has a population density higher than Calcutta or Hong Kong.164  Figure 
10 is a map of Sadr City. 
 
                                            
162 The high of 3.2 million came from an interview of MAJ Humphreys of 3rd BCT, 4th Infantry 
Division in an article by Michael Totten.  Michael Totten, Sadr City After the Fall, April 8, 2009, 
http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2009/04/sadr-city-after.php (accessed May 25, 2011).  
The low of two million came from an article by Glen Tschirgi.  Glen Tschirgi, Sadr City's Lesson 
for Gaza, January 13, 2009, 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/01/does_sadr_city_have_a_lesson_f.html (accessed May 
25, 2011).  However, despite sources stating the population as over 2 million, it is hard to believe.  
Hong Kong and Calcutta are stacked with high-rise residential buildings.  Sadr City’s residences 
average less than four stories.  But if there are 30 people living in 1000 sqft dwellings, the 
reported population may be correct. 
163 Middle East: Iraq, May 17, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/iz.html (accessed May 22, 2011). 
164 Damian Cave, Sadr City starts to turn around, posing new challenges - Africa & Middle 
East - International Herald Tribune, February 08, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/world/africa/08iht-sadr.4525914.html (accessed May 27, 
2011). 
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Figure 10.   Map of Sadr City165 
Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Karim Kassem built Sadr City in the late 1950s, 
as public housing for the city’s poor.166  The streets were lined in a grid pattern 
and 125,000 residences were built.  The individual residences were 
approximately 1,500 square feet.167  Since the 1950s, the original 1,500 square 
foot residences have been subdivided and subdivided again as the population 
grew.  The subdivision and growing population have only hastened the 
deterioration of the infrastructure, which had already faced neglect for three 
decades under the government of Saddam Hussein and the resulting instability 
following the U.S. invasion in 2003.168  Mike Davis, in Planet of Slums, writes of 
places like Sadr City as volcanoes waiting to erupt.169 
Colonel Peter R. Mansoor and Major Mark S. Ulrich write on 
counterinsurgency and list three prerequisites for an insurgency to exist.  They 
break the prerequisites down into three categories: 
• Vulnerable Population – a vulnerable population is one with social, 
political, economic, or security related grievances 
• Leadership for Direction – There must be a person, group, or idea 
to mobilize the vulnerable populace 
• Lack of government control – The government must be non-
responsive or overly repressive. Therefore, the government does 
not have legitimacy170 
                                            
165 Michael Totten, Sadr City After the Fall, April 8, 2009, 
http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2009/04/sadr-city-after.php (accessed May 25, 2011). 
166 Sadr City, May 22, 2011, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iraq/sadr_city/index.html 
(accessed May 22, 2011). 
167 Cave, 2007. 
168 Cave, 2007.  
169 As cited in Peter W. Singer, The Future of National Security, By the Numbers, May 22, 
2011, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/05_national_security_singer.aspx (accessed May 
22, 2011). 
170 Colonel Peter R. Mansoor and Major Mark S. Ulrich, "Linking Doctrine to Action: A New 
COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis," [PDF] Military Review (September-October 2007). 
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Sadr City met all three prerequisites.  The population was neglected under 
Saddam Hussein.  The sectarian violence and lack of security after the fall of 
Saddam furthered the population’s vulnerability.  Muqtada Al Sadr emerged to 
provide leadership and direction.  The unstable conditions following the fall of 
Saddam created a void of government control.  The conditions in Sadr City were 
ripe for an insurgency.  
2.   Nation Building at the Tactical Level 
This was the situation that confronted one Army unit when they assumed 
responsibility of Sadr City in late 2007.  The first priority was to establish security.  
The plan to do this was similar to what was used in Gaza.  In 2008, U.S. forces 
began constructing a concrete wall that ran the length of Sadr City, cutting off the 
Southern quarter of city.  The wall, known as the Gold Wall, as it ran along Route 
Gold, limited the Mahdi Army’s freedom to maneuver and protected the populace 
from their influence.  “Once the citizens behind the Gold Wall were confident of 
continuing protection from Jay’sh al-Mahdi (JAM) reprisals, businesses re-
opened, security improved dramatically and actionable intelligence from the 
population soared.”171 Also during this time, Muqtada al Sadr, called for a 
ceasefire, and stood down JAM.172  
With security in place, further development and reconstruction could 
occur.  U.S. forces and other American agencies began working on a range of 
projects from health to education.  Twenty-two roads were nominated for 
repaving and improvement.  Sixteen sewer mains in the city were cleaned out to 
eliminate the festering pools of waste that once polluted the town and its market 
areas.173 In this year, 2008, $44 million dollars in U.S. aid was spent inside Sadr 
                                            
171 Tschirgi,  2009. 
172 Michael R. Gordon, War Over Wall Persists in Sadr City Despite Truce, May 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/world/middleeast/15wall.html (accessed May 31, 2011). 
173 Cave, 2007. 
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City.174  Markets that once were vacant under sectarian violence were now 
bustling with business.175  Parks were being filled with children.  Normalcy was 
returning to Sadr City.176   
Assistance was not limited to security, economic, and essential service 
assistance.  Advisors from the U.S. State Department mentored local 
government officials.  The mentorship was in the nascent phase and having 
government officials just attend a meeting was progress.  As progress continued, 
mentorship of the local government officials expanded with the goal to assist 
them in performing the basic governmental functions of communicating between 
the different levels of government, making decisions, and executing a budget.177 
E.    EVALUATING THE TACTICAL UNIT ON THE FAILED STATE INDEX 
1.   Operationalizing the Failed State Index 
 The Failed State Index was designed for use at the strategic level.  The 
index is looking at stability of the state.  The evaluation of the indicators will need 
to be modified in order to function at the tactical level.  
The modification relies on filtering the indicators from the Index through 
the logical lines of operations (LLO) in Army doctrine FM 3-24 
COUNTERINSURGENCY.178 The result of this process is the Tactical Outcome 
Assessment.  The Tactical Outcome Assessment, shown in Figure 11, is the 
operationalized Failed State Index for use at the tactical level.  
                                            
174 Reconstruction: Brig. Gen. Talley, Mr. Nazar Al-Sultan, Mr. Bass, Jan. 15, January 15, 
2009, http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=24945&Itemid=131 
(accessed May 31, 2011). 
175 Totten, 2009. 
176 Totten, 2009. 
177 The information in this paragraph is from eyewitness accounts of the author who served 
in Sadr City from 2009-2010 and personally knew the State Department Officials involved in the 
mentoring. 
178 Field Manual No. 3-24 COUNTERINSURGENCY, 2006, 5-3. 
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Figure 11.   Tactical Outcome Assessment 
The most important part of these indicators is determining what metric will 
represent each individual indicator.  The tactical unit doing the measuring must 
make this determination.  Ideally, battalion or special operations task force 
(SOTF) staffs will determine the representative metrics.  However, it may be 
more practical for brigade or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) staffs to 
handle this effort as their staffs are more robust than battalions and SOTFs.   
Some metrics representative of the indicators are obvious—refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) are represented by refugees and IDPs.  
Other indicators need more deduction.  What represents economic opportunities 
in a specific area?  More stores opening in Jamilla market may represent 
increased economic opportunities in Sadr City, Iraq.  More goats per family may 
represent increased economic opportunities in Helmand, Afghanistan.  A 
decrease in the tangle of electric wires running from private generators or illegal 
taps that tangle the city streets and are ripped down by the antennas of military 
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vehicles on patrol may mean an increase in access to essential services in 
Baghdad, Iraq.  The need for private generators and illegal wiretaps diminish, as 
the Iraqi government is able to improve its ability to provide electricity to its 
citizens.  This is reflected by the decrease in  “spider webs” of electrical cords 
shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12.   Electrical Wires in Adhamiyah179 
Metrics representative for most of the indicators can be found by simply 
asking, “What does right look like?” To determine an indicator for rule of law, the 
correct question is, “What should a functioning judicial system look like in this 
area?” The answer may be a tribal elder handling disputes without corruption or 
accepting bribes.  What does increased security look like?  In some areas, it may 
look like functioning checkpoints. What should increased access to essential 
services look like?  In Baghdad, Iraq one of the sub-indicators would look like 
                                            
179 Totten, 2009. 
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city-provided power, void of illegal taps.  The answers to these questions will 
identify indicators and provide a basis for measurement.  If the answers cannot 
be seen or found, they are not good indicators.   
The questions should be simple.  Does this village have a tribal elder that 
is handling disputes?  If yes, how effective is the tribal elder on a scale of one to 
ten?  Does this town have functioning checkpoints?  If yes, how effective are the 
checkpoints on a scale of one to ten?  Keeping the questions to yes and no 
responses with a variable scale standardizes the process and allows for 
aggregating the scores like in the Failed State Index.  To note, these scores 
should not be the only information on the area; qualitative assessments should 
accompany. 
Once metrics representative of the indicators have been found and 
measured, numerical values will be assigned.  The ten-point scoring system, the 
same method used by the Failed State Index, will be used.  Each indicator will be 
assigned a value from one to ten.  The scores for each indicator will then be 
aggregated to determine a single number for their area.  Liberty is being 
exercised in aggregating the numbers.  The numbers being aggregated are not 
cardinal numbers.  However, coming up with a single number as a score is 
beneficial as it aids in showing trends—whether the situation is improving or 
worsening. 
The Tactical Outcome Assessment, although not tested, should be more 
consistent in determining outcomes for the following reasons:   
• This system is not prescriptive and, therefore, should not lead to 
problems with metrics discussed in Chapter III.  
• This system credits the unit on the ground with being the expert in 
its area and mandates unit involvement in determining what will be 
measured. 
• This system develops area specific metrics to accurately represent 
the ten indicators, instead of dictating to the unit on the ground 
specific metrics that may not apply.    
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The use of this system should not overly task military units.  A typical BCT 
or JSOTF staff—through mission analysis, intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield (IPB), and establishing commander’s critical information requirements 
(CCIR) —already has the knowledge base to develop metrics representative of 
the seven indicators for their OE.  Next, developing a collection plan for the 
metrics is not anything different than what BCT staffs are already doing.  
Subordinate units who will execute the collection plan are not being tasked with 
anything outside of what they are already routinely tasked to do.  This system 
bears no additional cost.   
The Tactical Outcome Assessment is something that can be included into 
the unit’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR).  The PIR reporting standard will 
remain the same except for the additional requirements.  This system, for the 
above reasons, should be effective at determining outcomes that are accurate 
(within a unit’s ability to collect), informative, and determine where and how to 
spend time and money.  
2.   Evaluating a Tactical Unit in Sadr City with the Operationalized 
Failed State Index 
This section serves as an example of how the Failed State Index, 
operationalized to the tactical level, can evaluate outcomes in a tactical unit’s 
OE.  Information has been gained from the above case study.  Not all information 
is available to complete the assessment of outcomes.  However, this example 
will demonstrate the basics of the system. 
Sadr City is a densely populated urban area.  What does right look like in 
a densely populated urban area?  Should there be a functioning sewage system?  
Should there be a functioning police or security force?  Questions like these need 
to be asked to determine metrics to represent the seven indicators.   
Sub-indicators for 1. Increasing/Decreasing Security for this case study 
will be:  
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• Degree change in the number of SIGACTs from previous reporting 
period (0-10), 0 equals great reduction in SIGACTs, 5 equals no 
change, 10 equals great increase 
• Degree change in the number of tips resulting in actionable 
intelligence from previous reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great 
increase in tips, 5 equals no change, 10 equals great decrease 
• Degree change in the number of people in markets from previous 
reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great increase, 5 equals no 
change, 10 equals great decrease 
• Degree change in the number of people in parks from previous 
reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great increase, 5 equals no 
change, 10 equals great decrease  
Sub-indicators for 2. Increasing/Decreasing Governance for this case 
study will be:  
• Degree change in the effectiveness of scheduled meetings from 
previous reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great increase in 
functionality, 5 equals no change, 10 equals great decrease 
Sub-indicators for 3. Increasing/Decreasing Economic Opportunities for 
this case study will be:  
• Degree change in market place activity from previous reporting 
period (0-10), 0 equals great increase in functionality, 5 equals no 
change, 10 equals great decrease 
• Degree change in the number of new businesses from previous 
reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great increase in functionality, 5 
equals no change, 10 equals great decrease 
Sub-indicators for 4. Increasing/Decreasing Access to Essential Services 
for this case study will be:  
• Rate of progress of construction projects from previous reporting 
period (0-10), 0 equals great increase in functionality, 5 equals no 
change, 10 equals great decrease 
• Degree change in sewage on the streets from previous reporting 
period (0-10), 0 equals great reduction in SIGACTs, 5 equals no 
change, 10 equals great increase 
Utilizing the above sub-indicators and 10-point scoring system, the case 
study will provide the following result illustrated below in Figure 13: 
1.  I/D Security (0 best, 10 worst) 2 
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1.1  Degree change in the number of SIGACTs from previous reporting 
period (0-10), 0 equals great reduction in SIGACTs, 5 equals no change, 
10 equals great increase 
2 
1.2 Degree change in the number of tips resulting in actionable 
intelligence from previous reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great 
increase in tips, 5 equals no change, 10 equals great decrease 
3 
1.3 Degree change in the number of people in markets from previous 
reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great increase, 5 equals no change, 10 
equals great decrease 
1 
1.4 Degree change in the number of people in parks from previous 
reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great increase, 5 equals no change, 10 
equals great decrease 
1 
2.  I/D Governance (0 best, 10 worst) 4 
2.1 Degree change in the effectiveness of scheduled meetings from 
previous reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great increase in functionality, 
5 equals no change, 10 equals great decrease 
4 
3.  I/D Economic Opportunities (0 best, 10 worst) 2 
3.1 Degree change in market place activity from previous reporting 
period (0-10), 0 equals great increase in functionality, 5 equals no 
change, 10 equals great decrease 
1 
3.2 Degree change in the number of new businesses from previous 
reporting period (0-10), 0 equals great increase in functionality, 5 equals 
no change, 10 equals great decrease 
3 
4.  I/D Access to ESS (0 best, 10 worst) 3 
4.1 Rate of progress of construction projects from previous reporting 
period (0-10), 0 equals great increase in functionality, 5 equals no 
change, 10 equals great decrease 
3 
4.2 Degree change in sewage on the streets from previous reporting 
period (0-10), 0 equals great reduction in SIGACTs, 5 equals no change, 
10 equals great increase 
2 
Tactical Outcome Assessment (1. + 2. + 3. + 4.) 11 
Figure 13.    Tactical Outcome Assessment Filled Out 
The Tactical Outcome Assessment does rely on subjectivity of the one 
conducting the assessment.  There is a possibility that those responsible for 
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completing the assessment will be tempted to report more favorably.  However, it 
is the unit that has created the metrics it believes are capable of measuring 
outcomes in their OE.  This should create a vested interest to mitigate against 
inaccurate reporting.  
3.   Tactical Outcomes Nesting With the Broader Strategy in U.S. 
Nation Assistance Missions 
The above example of measuring outcomes at the tactical level will readily 
nest with the broader strategy in U.S. nation assistance missions.  The outcomes 
above are measuring stability in accordance with the Failed State Index.  The 
goal of U.S. nation assistance missions is stability.   
The example from the above case study in 2008 shows increasing stability 
for the area.  Utilizing the Failed State Index, which measures stability at 
strategic levels: Iraq in 2007 was listed as the second most unstable country in 
the world; Iraq in 2008 was listed as the fifth most unstable country in the world; 
Iraq in 2009 was listed as the sixth most unstable country in the world; Iraq in 
2010 was listed as the seventh most unstable country in the world; Iraq in 2011 
was listed as the ninth most unstable country in the world.  For the last 5 years 
Iraq has become more and more stable.  The above case study nests with these 
results, although significantly more case studies would be needed to show that 
this method of measuring outcomes does nest with the broader strategy of U.S. 
nation assistance missions. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A.  CONCLUSION 
This thesis has investigated two vital problem areas: first, what models are 
helpful in developing metrics that measure outcomes in nation assistance 
operations and, second, what models are ineffective in determining metrics that 
measure outcomes in nation assistance operations? It also addressed the two 
initial research questions: What metrics should tactical level military units employ 
for measuring outcomes in nation assistance (NA) operations? How should a 
unit’s measures of effectiveness in its specific operating environment connect to 
metrics of its command and ultimately nest with the broader strategy in U.S. NA 
operations?  The Tactical Outcome Assessment developed in Chapter V is a 
significant step toward final answers of the latter two questions.   
1. Theories and  Models Useful in Determining Metrics That 
Measure Outcomes 
This thesis has found models and definitions that are useful in determining 
metrics that measure outcomes in nation assistance operations.  The rational 
actor model, used by Thomas Schelling, is helpful as it explains the motivation of 
the populace.180  Dr. McCormick’s Diamond Model is useful in analyzing an area 
as it contains a feedback mechanism that can be used to explain increasing or 
decreasing success as the population support moves from the insurgent to the 
state or from the state to the insurgent.181  The logic model is necessary for 
understanding the differences between inputs, throughputs, outputs, and 
outcomes.182   These terms are necessary in developing metrics.  Correlation 
and causation are two additional terms that need to be understood for developing 
metrics. 
                                            
180 Schelling,1966, 38–58. 
181 Wendt, 2005: 2–13. 
182 "Logic Model Development Guide”, 2004, 1. 
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a.  Rational Actor Model 
Thomas Schelling’s rational actor model is based on the cost of 
punishment associated with noncompliance multiplied by the likelihood of the 
punishment being implemented as the decision criteria.183  This is weighted 
against the benefits of noncompliance.  What this means is that a rational actor 
will evaluate the likelihood that he will be punished by an external actor and the 
capability of that external actor to punish for noncompliance against the benefits 
they will receive for noncompliance.  If the likelihood that they will be punished is 
low or the capability of that actor to punish is low, then the external actor will 
have less influence on the rational actor’s decision-making process.  If there is 
more than one external actor, the rational actor will make the evaluation of the 
likelihood and capability to punish for each external actor.  The rational actor 
model is about weighing costs and benefits of actions. 
What this means for the development of metrics is that it explains 
the motivation of the populace.  The populace will act a certain way based on 
how they interpret the costs and benefits of action in a specific situation.  If we 
see more women out by themselves, wearing more western style dress in an 
area of traditional Taliban control, we can infer that the degree of Taliban control 
has lessened, as those women no longer believe there is a cost that the Taliban 
can impose. 
b.  Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model 
Dr. McCormick’s Model simplifies counterinsurgency to the 
interactions between the four actors, the government, insurgency, populace, and 
international actors.184  The model lays these actors out in a diamond pattern 
with one of the actors at each point in the diamond.  The lines that connect the 
points of the diamond pattern represent the relationships amongst the actors.  
The model contains a feedback and support loop to measure the populace’s 
                                            
183 Schelling, 1966, 38–58. 
184 Wendt, 2005. 
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support for the government or insurgency: support for the government is seen by 
the populace supplying the government information on the insurgency; support 
for the insurgency is seen through the populace supplying the insurgency with 
people, guns and money. 
For developing metrics, this model gives two hard metrics.  The first 
is the number of actionable intelligence items received from the populace.  The 
second is the amount of aid and support given by the populace to the insurgency.  
The first metric is easier to track through the standard reporting procedures units 
in Iraq and Afghanistan are currently using.  However, the second metric, the 
amount of aid and support given by the populace to the insurgency, is harder to 
identify. 
c. The Logic Model 
The logic model is composed of four elements: inputs, activities or 
throughputs, outputs, and outcomes.  Inputs are defined as the resources 
available to “utilize towards doing the work.”185  Resources can be human, such 
as the number of troops available, the amount of money available, or equipment.  
Activities are what the organization does with the resources.  “Activities are the 
processes, tools, events, technology, and actions…”186 Outputs, by contrast, are 
the direct products of the activities.  Outputs could be the number of high value 
targets (HVTs) killed or captured, the number of schools built, or the number of 
patrols conducted.  Outcomes are the specific changes in the target’s “behavior, 
knowledge, skills, status, and level of functioning.”187 
The terms used in the logic model are needed for developing 
metrics.  Without knowledge of the terms, it is easy to develop metrics that 
instead of developing outcomes end up measuring outputs, throughputs, or 
inputs.  The latter three do not matter in determining what effect operations are 
                                            
185 "Logic Model Development Guide,” 2004, 2.  
186 "Logic Model Development Guide,” 2004, 1. 
187 "Logic Model Development Guide," 2004, 2. 
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actually having.  They only measure the efficiency of unit performance and not 
the effectiveness of unit performance.  
d.   Correlation vs. Causation 
Causation is a term used to refer to a direct relationship between a 
dependent variable and an independent variable.  Correlation is a term used to 
refer to a relationship that is not direct but exists to some degree between a 
dependent variable and an independent variable.  In correlation, the degree to 
which the relationship exists factors in to whether the effect seen on the 
dependent variable is replicable or happened by chance.   
Correlation is based on the percent of variability in the relationship 
determined through statistical analysis.  An explanation for ninety-five percent of 
the variability of the relationship between the independent variable and 
dependent variable is the percent commonly accepted as having statistical 
significance.188  Knowing this provides necessary insight for evaluating claims of 
30.2, 67, or even 76 percent correlation between the independent and dependent 
variables.189 
This is useful in developing metrics because the complexity of 
nation assistance operations may prevent the discovery of a direct relationship 
between the dependent and independent variable.  Determining the degree of 
correlation in the relationship becomes necessary for determining whether the 
effect between the dependent and independent variable is replicable or 
happened by chance.190  Action or decision will invariably rely on when 
correlation can be paired to experience that shows the correlation to be a 
plausible relationship.  
                                            
 188 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 40.  
 189 Gorkowski (2009) found 30.2 percent of the variability in increasing violence is 
explained by CERP expenditure, Clarke and Onufer (2009) found that 67 of the variability in 
increasing violence is explained by increasing unemployment, O’Connell (2008) found that 76 
percent of the variability in Taliban attacks is explained by increases in security projects. 
 190 Campbell & Campbell, 2006, 40.  
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2. What is Not Effective and What is Not Useful in Determining 
Metrics that Measure Outcomes 
a.   Overly Complex Qualitative and Overly Detailed 
Quantitative Metrics that Fail to Measure Outcomes 
Iraq and Afghanistan have both seen the use of qualitative and 
quantitative assessments.  Qualitative methods have created metrics too difficult 
for military units to operationalize.  An example of a qualitative method is the 
TCAPF.  Quantitative methods require too many indicators for reporting and 
focus more on measuring outputs than outcomes.  An example of a quantitative 
method is the MPICE, which has over 800 metrics.191  
b.   Data Analysis 
In order to conduct data analysis, a dependent variable must be 
selected.  The problem is immediate as there is no good dependent variable to 
use for nation assistance.  The dependent variable needs to represent the goal of 
promoting long-term regional stability.  Violence against coalition forces, violence 
against civilians, or number of tips reported have been used as the dependent 
variable. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of nation assistance and the 
complexity of the goal of nation assistance, choosing any of the aforementioned 
examples as a dependent variable may be lacking.  Levels of violence may rise 
or fall independent of stability increasing.   
The next problem with data analysis is that the data “is only as 
accurate as the discipline, reporting standards, and priorities of those units 
reporting.”192 When analyzing data, it is almost impossible to know the 
circumstances in which the data was collected.  The data set may tell you exactly 
where, when, and how many improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were found, 
enemy direct attacks occurred, or tips called-in.  However, the data does not tell 
                                            
191 Dziedzic, Sotirin, Agoglia, 2008. 
192 Beskow notes duplicate reporting, incomplete reports, and reports lacking geographical 
data as common problems.  Beskow, 2011. 
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you if more friendly or enemy troops moved into the area, if friendly or enemy 
troops changed their TTPs, or if there was a change in the civilian population.  As 
a result, findings from the data can be scrutinized with questions that cannot be 
answered.  
3. Tactical Outcome Assessment 
The Tactical Outcome Assessment is a system designed for tactical units 
to measure outcomes in their OE.  The Tactical Outcome Assessment 
operationalizes the Failed State Index developed by the Fund for Peace for a 
tactical unit. The logical lines of operations (LLO) in Army doctrine FM 3-24 
COUNTERINSURGENCY were used to filter the indicators from the Failed State 
Index.  Changes were also made in restructuring the indicators to read more like 
measurements, since the goal of the indicators is to measure outcomes.  
Below is the Tactical Outcome Assessment with its seven indicators. 
1. Increasing/Decreasing Security 
2. Increasing/Decreasing Governance 
3. Increasing/Decreasing Economic Opportunities 
4. Increasing/Decreasing Access to Essential Services 
5. Increasing/Decreasing Rule of Law 
6. Increasing/Decreasing Movement/Number of Refugees or Internally 
Displaced Persons 
7. Increasing/Decreasing Return/Flight of Influential Individuals 
The next step in using the Tactical Outcome Assessment is to determine 
what metric will represent each individual indicator.  This responsibility is up to 
the tactical unit, and a BCT or JSOTF staff—through mission analysis, 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and establishing commander’s 
critical information requirements (CCIR)—already has the knowledge base to 
develop metrics representative of the seven indicators for their OE.    
Metrics representative for most of the indicators can be found by simply 
asking, “What does right look like?” The answers to this question will identify 
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indicators and provide a basis for which to be measured.  If the answers cannot 
be seen or found, they are not good indicators.   
Asking, “What does right look like?” keeps the questions simple. Keeping 
the questions to yes and no responses with a variable scale from one to ten 
standardizes the process and allows for aggregating the scores like in the Failed 
State Index. The scores for each indicator will then be aggregated to determine a 
single number for their area.  Liberty is being exercised in aggregating the 
numbers.  The numbers being aggregated are not cardinal numbers.  However, 
coming up with a single number as a score is beneficial as it aids in showing 
trends. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Implementation  
The metric reporting requirements to higher headquarters most likely will 
not track outcomes, or will be too general to be the most effective system to use 
in a specific area.  A grassroots effort should be initiated by BCT and JSOTF 
staff officers to implement outcome-focused metrics, built from the Tactical 
Outcome Assessment, into the unit’s PIR.  Inputting into the PIR will ensure that 
resources are diverted to reporting on the outcome-focused metrics. 
2. Areas for Further Research 
Areas for further research identified include testing the Tactical Outcome 
Assessment on a nation assistance operation.  Testing the Tactical Outcome 
Assessment will identify whether or not it is effective at actually measuring 
outcomes as well as identifying areas where it can be improved. 
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